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This thesis grounds historical analysis in rhetorical theory to build upon narrative studies of the 
Liberal Party in the period 1959 to 1974. It uses the particular case study to further our 
understanding of rhetorical theory as applied to political analysis. Liberal Party oratory in the 
mid-twentieth century has thus far been neglected, but there is a developing body of rhetorical 
theory, and especially the concepts conceived of within rhetorical political analysis, which can 
be used to examine its rhetoric. This thesis will deploy the tools of rhetorical political analysis 
to build upon the existing literature, taking inspiration from the work on specific speeches, 
arenas of rhetoric, and techniques of rhetorical expression. It will consider appeals to ethos and 
the Liberal conception of its implied audience, their potential voter, in order to centre the 
importance of audience within RPA. It will consider how Liberal rhetoric shifted from a values-
frame in the 1960s to one of crisis in the 1970s, to foreground such processes as creative acts 
of definition and construction. It will then analyse Liberal out-of-election-time campaigns to 
interrogate differing appeals to internal and external audiences and the debate surrounding the 
rhetorical situation, arguing that the Liberals used these campaigns to create moments for 
Liberal progress outside of elections. This thesis will argue that the most productive research 
comes in combining political history and rhetorical analysis. It will use analysis of rhetoric to 
learn more about the Liberal Party’s activity, and, by grounding rhetorical theory in historical 
examples, it will in turn require the theory to be refined. To learn more about political parties, 
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Introduction: A rhetorical approach to understanding politics 
The Liberal Party was at a low ebb in 1959. It had just fought its first election under leader Jo 
Grimond, winning six seats from six percent of the vote. It needed to consolidate its policy, re-
establish a party image and build up its membership and financial base. In 1974 the Liberal 
Party won over eleven million votes across two elections. The creative persuasive opportunities 
that rhetoric provided were a crucial tool at its disposal in achieving this progress. The 
rhetorical process must be conceived broadly, from context and strategy to appeal and delivery. 
It is inseparable from the party political process of persuasion.  
In studying the Liberal Party between 1959 and 1974 through the lens of rhetoric, this thesis 
grounds historical analysis in rhetorical theory. It uses this conceptual approach to build upon 
narrative studies of the Liberal Party in the period, and the particular case study furthers our 
understanding of rhetorical theory as should be applied to political analysis. The thesis asks 
two questions: What does a study of Liberal Party rhetoric tell us about the Liberal Party’s aims 
and activities in this period? And what does a study of Liberal Party rhetoric tell us about 
rhetoric, and how its study might be developed for the benefit of political histories? Through 
arguing that the Liberal Party used its rhetoric to respond to challenges specific to them, such 
as overcoming a vague party image and continually attempting to improve its organisational 
and financial situations, this thesis shows that the most productive analysis comes from 
combining rhetorical theory with empirical analysis, as scholars must continue to develop 
better analytical tools to understand the importance of rhetoric.  
This thesis therefore engages with two seams of scholarly literature: studies of the Liberal Party 
in this period and wider approaches to rhetoric. Liberal Party histories of this period have 
tended to be narratives situated in a longer-term context of Liberal and national history.1 David 
Dutton’s work relied on primary and secondary material concentrated on national figures, such 
as Grimond, to focus on national themes,2 and in Vernon Bogdanor’s history of the Liberal 
Party, William Wallace sought to categorise the era neatly, charting “survival and revival” 
based primarily on election time results.3 Biographies of Grimond and Jeremy Thorpe have 
been similarly narrative, exploring chronological themes, without scrutinising the rhetoric 
 
1 V. Bogdanor, Liberal Party Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); D. Dutton, A History of the Liberal 
Party in the Twentieth Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
2 Dutton, Liberal Party, 315-317. 
3 W. Wallace, ‘Survival and Revival’, in Bogdanor, Liberal Party Politics, 43. 
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used.4 A rhetorical approach allows us to develop these narratives by exploring the specifics of 
what Liberals thought and spoke about. Most notably, this literature obscures the importance 
of the local to Liberal Party politics in the period. A rhetorical focus encourages a more holistic 
view of Liberal Party imperatives with both national and local foci because so much crucial 
Liberal rhetoric was aimed at the local. 
An adjoining literature on the local has been written by Liberals, for Liberals, predominantly 
in the Journal of Liberal History. 5 This work, such as Neil Stockley’s narrative work on the 
February 1974 election, considers national and local Liberal appeals but could be strengthened 
by a rhetorical approach.6 Stockley states that the Liberals ‘adroitly exploited the government’s 
acute economic and industrial problems’, without examining the language used to achieve this.7 
Similarly, historians have written on Liberal by-elections in the period, and especially the 
famous Liberal victory at Orpington in 1962, but more descriptively than rhetorically.8 Part of 
the appeal of rhetorical analysis, therefore, is to study how the Liberals created and expressed 
both local and national appeals, to better understand those appeals. Richard Toye considered 
appeals to Liberal voters in 1945, but in Conservative rhetoric.9 It is important to consider how 
the Liberal Party sought to propagate its policy and ideology nationally, and aimed to bring 
about electoral success in specific constituencies. The range of rhetorical sources deployed in 
this thesis allows a comprehensive history of the Liberal Party to reflect Liberal-specific themes 
between 1959 and 1974. 
Political historians have long engaged with rhetoric without making it fundamental to their 
analysis. However, a more systematic quasi-rhetorical political analysis has now existed for 
nearly thirty years. Amongst the best known is Karen Musolf’s work on Nancy Astor which 
appreciated the agency of rhetoric in shaping events and equated the rhetorical with the 
political, the economic and social.10 Philip Williamson’s work on Stanley Baldwin is a similar 
 
4 M. McManus, Jo Grimond: Towards the Sound of Gunfire (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2001); S. Freeman and B. 
Penrose, Rinkagate: The Rise and Fall of Jeremy Thorpe (London: Bloomsbury, 1996). 
5 M. Egan, ‘1959-74: years of Liberal revolution?’, Newsletter (Liberal Democrat History Group), 14 (1997), 2-
3. 
6 N. Stockley, ‘1974 Remembered’, Journal of Liberal Democrat History, 26 (2000), 19-21. 
7 Stockley, ‘1974 Remembered’, 20. 
8 M. Egan, ‘The lessons of Orpington’, Newsletter (Liberal Democrat History Group), 14 (1997), 10-11. 
9 R. Toye, ‘”I am a Liberal as much as a Tory”: Winston Churchill and the memory of 1906’, Journal of Liberal 
History, 54 (2007), 38-45; R. Toye, ‘Winston Churchill’s “Crazy Broadcast”: Party, Nation, and the 1945 
Gestapo Speech’, Journal of British Studies, 49 (2010), 655-680. 
10 K. J. Musolf, From Plymouth to Parliament: A Rhetorical History of Nancy Astor’s 1919 Campaign (London: 
Macmillan, 1999).  
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example.11 More directly relevant to this project is Peter Joyce’s PhD on ‘The electoral strategy 
and tactics of the British Liberal Party 1945-70’ which covers a similar historical period to this 
project and so is an important base from which this project builds.12 Despite his extensive study 
of speeches, Joyce’s work is an exploration of themes rather than a rhetorical analysis. He 
explores the arguments that the Liberals sought to make – such as Grimond calling for political 
realignment – and is in this sense a forerunner to rhetorical political analysis, explored below. 
In that sense, whilst Musolf, Williamson and Joyce were thorough in covering and quoting 
their selected orator’s speeches, they did not undertake rhetorical political analysis, as 
conceived below, which certainly encompasses themes but connects them to the wider 
rhetorical processes of invention and expression.13  
The study of rhetoric has developed significantly over the last decade, led by researchers in 
political theory and social science. Scholars have sought to push beyond approaches such as 
rational choice theory and behaviouralism, to understand political argumentation and the 
processes behind its creation and expression in more depth. This has led to a changed 
understanding of rhetoric and its importance, that is most obviously associated with the work 
of Alan Finlayson, Judi Atkins and James Martin.14 Rhetoric, they conclude, is not just the 
expression of stable themes. It is the contest of ideas and beliefs and how they might be best 
articulated to a particular audience, in a particular context, within the restrictive framework of 
particular social norms. So, the audience, context and norms necessarily shape the ideas and 
beliefs; that is the rhetorical process. Rhetoric is thus an instance of ‘creative political action’ 
that needs to be analysed.15  
This insight has led to the development of “rhetorical political analysis” (RPA), a framework 
of tools and concepts predicated upon the notion that studying argument and its creation and 
expression can reveal much about politics, motivations and contexts. Finlayson lays out the 
 
11 P. Williamson, Stanley Baldwin: Conservative Leadership and National Values (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
12 P. Joyce, ‘The electoral strategy and tactics of the British Liberal Party, 1945-70’, (London, PhD, 1990). 
13 Whilst historians have not necessarily focused on rhetorical analysis, they have studied the context of 
communication in politics: see L. Beers, ‘Whose Opinion? Changing Attitudes Towards Opinion Polling in 
British Politics, 1937-64’, Twentieth Century British History, 17 (2006), 177-205; J. Lawrence, Electing our 
Masters: The Hustings in British politics from Hogarth to Blair (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
14 A. Finlayson, ‘Political science, political ideas, and rhetoric’, Economy and Society, 33 (2004), 528-549; A. 
Finlayson, ‘From Beliefs to Arguments: Interpretive Methodology and Rhetorical Political Analysis’, British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations, 9 (2007), 545-563; A. Finlayson and J. Martin, ‘”It Ain’t What 
You Say…”: British Political Studies and the Analysis of Speech and Rhetoric’, British Politics, 3 (2008), 445-
464; A. Finlayson, ‘Proving, Pleasing and Persuading? Rhetoric in Contemporary British Politics’, The Political 
Quarterly, 85 (2014), 428-436. 
15 J. Martin, Politics and Rhetoric: A critical introduction (London: Routledge, 2014), 106. 
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stated aims of RPA as such: ‘RPA foregrounds the inter-subjective, dynamic, formation and 
reformation of arguments and the elements of which they are composed’.16 It acknowledges 
that ideas are not generated in a vacuum, but are strategically deployed in a particular context 
and for a particular audience. Accordingly, Martin located three aspects surrounding rhetoric 
to study: the rhetorical context, the rhetorical argument, and rhetorical effects.17 RPA thus 
considers contexts, audiences, and the processes of invention and delivery. This new theoretical 
work awards a lot more agency to rhetoric in the process of argumentation. Rhetoric can give 
us a much fuller understanding of arguments and the processes behind their creation, and RPA 
is a helpful set of tools and processes through which this understanding can be gained.  
Rhetorical political analysis has generally been undertaken with two differing foci – that on a 
particular rhetorician or speech, and that on a particular rhetorical technique, theme or context. 
However, we lack any study of the rhetoric of Liberal Party leaders Grimond or Thorpe beyond 
biography.18 Most British work has focused on the Conservative and Labour parties, in the last 
fifty years. Crines, Heppell and Hill’s work on Enoch Powell’s “Rivers of Blood” speech, for 
example, followed Martin’s approach to RPA.19 It considered the long-term context preceding 
the speech, analysed the speech itself (the appeals it was making and to whom), and ended by 
discussing its impact. Through combining context, argument and impact, this work 
demonstrated how the approach of RPA can enable understanding of the entire rhetorical 
process from idea to expression. Similarly, Crines’ work on Harold Wilson’s “White Heat” 
speech focused more closely on the appeals being made. In each of these cases, though, there 
has been the tendency to situate the analysis tightly within the structure of Aristotle’s three 
appeals – ethos, pathos and logos. For example, Crines wrote in summary that ‘Because of 
[Wilson’s] ethos, he was able to use sprinklings of pathos to ensure they accepted the logos of 
his argument’.20 Whilst a valuable application of Aristotle’s theory, it perhaps left the analysis 
a little too neat as the author sought to demonstrate how the three appeals tidily entwined within 
the overall argument of the rhetoric. It is important, then, not to let a framework such as ethos-
pathos-logos give an undue impression of coherence or of a strict division between the appeals.  
 
16 Finlayson, ‘From Beliefs to Arguments’, 560. 
17 J. Martin, ‘Situating Speech: A Rhetorical Approach to Political Strategy’, Political Studies, 63 (2015), 34-40.  
18 McManus, Grimond. 
19 A. S. Crines, T. Heppell and M. Hill, ‘Enoch Powell’s “Rivers of Blood” speech: a rhetorical political 
analysis’, British Politics, 11 (2016), 72-94.  
20 A. S. Crines, ‘A Discussion of Rhetoric in Harold Wilson’s White Heat Speech’, Renewal Journal of Social 
Democracy, 22 (2014), unpaginated.  
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Hayton and Crines have edited important volumes on Conservative and Labour orators of the 
twentieth-century.21 As in any work, these are constrained by their scope – the most high-
profile individuals, of the two major parties, stretching across a long time period. Partly as a 
consequence, however, they emphasise the three arenas of Parliament, conference and 
public/electorate and the chapters tend to orientate themselves around either themes 
surrounding each orator or analyse their subject tightly within the framework of the three 
appeals. This selective approach is natural for a developing type of analysis and enables the 
authors to cover a lot of ground, but is indicative of the fact that rhetorical political analysis 
can still be developed as an applied historical approach.  
As said, political theorists linked with RPA have also looked at the rhetorical techniques used 
in argument. Atkins and Finlayson have written on the use of Quotation, and Anecdote, in 
rhetoric. Quotation and Anecdotes are classes of rhetorical act. Atkins and Finlayson argue that 
using quotation – prior, known experience – reveals how symbolic and ritualised rhetoric can 
be.22 Anecdote is used similarly, as it elevates ‘everyday’ experience.23 The techniques used in 
rhetorical proof are a vital aspect of rhetorical analysis and demonstrate how RPA encompasses 
both idea and expression. The authors scrutinised the differing amount of use of quotation and 
anecdote by political parties in Britain, finding that their use has generally increased. This 
prompts consideration about (rhetorical and political) culture affecting the expression and 
reception of rhetoric, affirming the importance of external factors acting upon rhetoric. This is 
important to reflect upon for this thesis, especially in relation to a ‘minor’ party which pursues 
specific imperatives pertaining to its political situation.  
Another important contribution to this thesis’s conception of rhetoric is Kenneth Burke’s 
theory of “identification”.24 For Burke, rhetoric entails identifying something in common with 
your audience, from which basis the speaker can work to persuade the audience in other 
respects. Once common ground is discovered and a rapport is formed, persuasion is facilitated. 
Similarly, “identification through antithesis” consists of locating common ground with one’s 
 
21 A. S. Crines and R. Hayton, Labour orators from Bevan to Miliband (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2015); R. Hayton and A. S. Crines, Conservative orators from Baldwin to Cameron (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2015). 
22 J. Atkins and A. Finlayson, ‘”As Shakespeare so memorably said…”: Quotation, Rhetoric and the 
Performance of Politics’, Political Studies, 64 (2016), 164. This builds on earlier work not following RPA, such 
as J. Charteris-Black, Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004). 
23 J. Atkins and A. Finlayson, ‘”…A 40-year-old black man made the point to me”: Anecdotes, Everyday 
Knowledge and the Performance of Leadership in British Politics’, Political Studies, 61 (2013), 162. 
24 K. Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969).  
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audience against some negative phenomenon. Judi Atkins explored this theory in her work on 
the rhetoric of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government of 2010-15, where she 
argued that identification of the debt crisis – a negative phenomenon, “the problem” – laid the 
basis for coalition appeals to unity to “solve” the problem. 25 This problem-solution narrative 
of crisis and unity will prove instrumental in the writing of this thesis due to its comparability 
with Liberal appeals of 1974. “Identification” is a theoretical, audience-focused basis to the 
creation and expression of rhetoric. It is a theme that this thesis looks to use and develop. 
In that work, Atkins considered how the coalition government framed the political situation 
around a diagnosed problem with a necessary solution. Indeed, rhetoric must have a driving 
force behind it; a way of viewing the world, or a specific problem, informing upon its 
expression. There is a thriving scholarship produced on ‘framing’, but none that has interacted 
with scholarship on the Liberal Party; the closest is coverage of rhetorical themes.26 This thesis 
considers ‘framing’ rather than ‘invention’ to focus on how ideas appear in the practical 
expression of rhetoric. It remains in keeping with the rest of the thesis in considering the point 
at which the Liberals expressed their ideas to their audience. 
The concept of the frame is not new. American political scientists have written on framing. 
Jacoby argued that the frame is important because issues do not truly exist until they are 
communicated in a certain way to the public. There are different ways to articulate an issue and 
the rhetor’s task is to ‘maximise support for their own position’.27 Goffman articulated the 
frame as a creative act, with situations only existing as they are defined.28 Historically this has 
been studied in the form of agenda-setting.29 Myers’ work on Harold MacMillan and the Winds 
of Change considered how the problem of majority rule in South Africa was conceived and 
expressed to different audiences, while Kingdon’s more theoretical work focused on the 
articulation and emphasis of government policies. “Agenda-setting” has been exclusively 
studied in terms of major parties with a natural platform and audience, however. A third party 
is less driven by setting the agenda than by simply impacting upon the political conversation 
 
25 J. Atkins, ‘”Together in the National Interest”: The Rhetoric of Unity and the Formation of the Cameron-
Clegg Government’, Political Quarterly, 86 (2015), 85-92. 
26 Joyce, ‘Electoral Strategy’; Dutton, Liberal Party.  
27 W. Jacoby, ‘Issue Framing and Public Opinion on Government Spending’, American Journal of Political 
Science, 44 (2000), 750-752. 
28 E. Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organisation of Experience (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1974). 
29 F. Myers, ‘Harold Macmillan’s “Winds of Change” Speech: A Case Study in the Rhetoric of Policy Change’, 
Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 4 (2000), 555-575; J. W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies 
(London: Pearson, 2014). 
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and finding certain niches of appeal. ‘Definition’ and ‘resonance’ were the Liberal rhetorical 
imperatives rather than driving policy agendas.  
There have been more recent, rhetorical approaches to framing, indicating its worth as a focus 
of analysis. For example, Atkins’ work on the ideology of the Labour Party in the 2010s 
considered how the party used a coherent ideology as “argumentative contexts” to embody its 
thinking and produce core concepts as a basis from which to argue.30 Indeed, the purpose of 
ideology has simply been described as a ‘world view’31 or as a body of ‘concepts, values and 
symbols which incorporate conceptions of human nature’,32 definitions which allow ideologies 
to be conceptualised as frames. Freeden viewed ideologies as the re-articulations of existing 
traditions upon encountering new problems.33 Finlayson thus posited that ideologies must be 
viewed rhetorically, as a framework supplying commonplaces and a criteria of what is good 
and bad; they are then adapted to a particular situation.34 This “framework” of invention 
provides the tools through which the rhetor can then articulate their “frame” in the wild, 
dependent on context and audience. This was practically applied by Atkins in her study of Ed 
Miliband and the Labour Party, finding that “One Nation” ideology was the coherent frame 
used in Labour rhetoric. This literature on ideology proves the existence of rhetoric deploying 
underpinning frames and shows their importance in rhetorical invention. 
Finlayson’s work ‘What’s The Problem’ conceived “problem-setting”, a preferably 
encompassing term for creative acts of political definition. For Finlayson, problems are 
rhetorically constructed, and rhetorically solved.35 Indeed, situations do not exist until they are 
defined and constructed.36 Judi Atkins has written on the framing of a situation by constructing 
a problem and defining a solution.37 She considered the formation of the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat coalition government in Britain in 2010. The government located a national debt 
crisis from 2008, which it defined as caused by Labour fiscal irresponsibility. It could then 
logically argue of the solution being cuts to public spending – a plan predicated on being 
 
30 J. Atkins, ‘Narrating One Nation: The Ideology and Rhetoric of the Miliband Labour Party’, Politics, 33 
(2015), 19-31. 
31 J. Charteris-Black, Analysing Political Speeches: Rhetoric, Discourse and Metaphor (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014).  
32 A. Vincent, Modern Political Ideologies (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009). 
33 M. Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998).  
34 J. Atkins, ‘”Together in the National Interest”: The Rhetoric of Unity and the Formation of the Cameron-
Clegg Government’, Political Quarterly, 86 (2015), 85-92. 
35 A. Finlayson, ‘”What’s the Problem?”: Political Theory, Rhetoric and Problem-Setting’, Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy, 9 (2006), 541-557. 
36 Goffman, Frame Analysis. 
37 J. Atkins, ‘Together in the National Interest’. 
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responsible. The presentation of irresponsibility against responsibility moulded a coherent 
narrative in a problem-solution format. The coalition also used identification through antithesis 
in this negative-positive construction, identifying the previous Labour government as a 
common enemy causing crisis, to create a justification for the new government as a necessity 
in the national interest. This work provides a practical example to consider the rhetorical 
“problem-solution” frame.  
There is also scholarship specifically on the construction of “crisis” in the 1970s, the particular 
manifestation of framing in this period. Colin Hay suggested that the “Winter of Discontent” 
of 1978-9 was really a constructed ‘fundamental national crisis’ by the New Right.38 It recruited 
‘symptoms’ of a crisis to bring a particular narrative into existence, such as a ‘tyranny of the 
pickets’, enabling it to define striking trade unions as the cause. 39 It portrayed a ‘crisis of a 
monolithic state besieged by the trade unions’.40 The New Right thus emphasised particular 
aspects of the supposed crisis to place the Labour Party at the heart of its cause. For Saunders, 
this ‘specific interpretation’ by Margaret Thatcher and the Conservatives used crisis as a 
‘rhetorical device’ in order to ‘privilege particular responses’ to their benefit.41 Rhetors craft a 
particular narrative of a situation to encourage the audience to respond in a desired way. This 
literature is instructive for thought into how and why rhetorical organising concepts (frames) 
are created and expressed. 
Toye has demonstrated the scope of rhetorical analysis to challenge existing narratives, 
deploying it to explore the debate surrounding “consensus” in British politics after 1945. He 
argued that “consensus” was a rhetorical phenomenon only given meaning through its 
expression.42 In his work on Winston Churchill’s wartime oratory, he complicated the existing 
laudatory narrative by analysing audience and reception.43 Finally, he challenged the existing 
literature on RPA as being too orator-focused, calling for a greater emphasis on the rhetorical 
 
38 C. Hay, ‘Narrating Crisis: The Discursive Construction of the “Winter of Discontent”’, Sociology, 30 (1996), 
253. 
39 Hay, ‘Narrating Crisis’, 266. 
40 Hay, ‘Narrating Crisis’, 266. 
41 R. Saunders, ‘”Crisis? What crisis?” Thatcherism and the seventies’, in B. Jackson and R. Saunders, (eds.), 
Making Thatcher’s Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 25. 
42 R. Toye, ‘From “Consensus” to “Common Ground”: The Rhetoric of the Postwar settlement and its Collapse’, 
Journal of Contemporary History, 48 (2013), 3-23. 
43 R. Toye, The roar of the lion: the untold story of Churchill’s World War II speeches (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013). 
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culture surrounding the phenomena of speeches.44 This shows the power of rhetorical analysis 
to provide fresh perspectives on existing literatures.  
As seen, Liberal Party rhetoric in the mid-twentieth century has thus far been neglected, but 
there is a developing body of rhetorical theory, and especially the concepts conceived of within 
rhetorical political analysis, which can be used to examine it. This thesis intends to deploy the 
tools of RPA to build upon the existing literature, taking inspiration from the work on specific 
speeches, arenas of rhetoric, and techniques of rhetorical expression.  
As the tool used by political parties to mould their image, appeal to the electorate or respond 
to particular situations, studying rhetoric provides understanding both of what a party wanted 
to achieve and how it sought to achieve it. The Liberal Party held great influence in British 
politics even when its electoral votes did not reflect this. In the period 1959 to 1974 it was still 
a national party, with membership numbering in the hundreds of thousands, winning 
byelections, and driving new legislation.45 The fact that it has not yet been studied rhetorically 
provides the opportunity to scrutinise rhetorical theory as it appears in this specific case.  
As seen, rhetorical political analysis has often been planted discretely at a moment in time. 
This thesis contends that rhetoric is a continuous process, central to political activity, from 
establishing a party image to enlisting members in local activity, rather than simply a speech 
tool to be deployed when votes are sought. Finlayson’s conception of the rhetorical process 
encourages this longer-term look at rhetoric.46 As such this thesis considers the rhetorical 
activities of the Liberal Party over the fifteen years from 1959 to 1974. This chronological 
frame, while short enough to analyse specifics, encourages greater appreciation of contexts and 
imperatives, and rhetorical change over time, allowing the analysis to historicise rhetoric rather 
than freezing it in time. This particular period is fascinating as the Liberals rose from a party 
at its electoral nadir in 1959 to a party that considered itself to have a chance of being elected 
to government in 1974. This progress, and two contrasting party leaders, Jo Grimond and 
Jeremy Thorpe, allows us to chart rhetorical change. 
A broad source base befits this broad conception and as such, this study is based on extensive 
archival research. The Liberal Party and Election Address collections at the University of 
Bristol and the Liberal Party archive at the London School of Economics have proven essential. 
 
44 R. Toye, ‘The Rhetorical Culture of the House of Commons after 1918’, History, 99 (2014), 270-298. 
45 R. Douglas, The History of the Liberal Party, 1895-1970 (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1971). 
46 The full worth of other pieces, such as Burke’s theory of identification and Atkins’ subsequent work on it, is 
considered in the relevant chapters.  
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I have also consulted the Jeremy Thorpe papers at the British Library to supplement some 
analysis, but a different study might wish to use that and Jo Grimond’s personal archive at the 
National Library of Scotland to focus more on the two leaders. Chapter One uses individual 
constituency election addresses to explore how the party established an image for the electorate 
and constructed an audience to whom to appeal. Chapter Two uses a variety of leader and party 
publications – both policy and non-policy, inside and outside of election-time – to consider 
how Liberal rhetoric framed visions of British politics. Chapter Three studies out-of-election-
time campaigns to learn about Liberal Party imperatives and the role of rhetoric when the 
agenda is not the winning of votes. Of course, a fully comparative approach of the 
Conservative, Labour and Liberal parties would be valuable but here the former two are only 
used as a foil. This base, together with the ascribed fifteen-year time period, allows rhetoric to 
be considered to its fullest extent.  
This thesis therefore uses the case of the Liberal Party between 1959 and 1974 to consider three 
aspects of the rhetorical process. The first chapter considers appeals to ethos and the Liberal 
conception of its implied audience, the potential voter, understanding how individual 
candidates presented themselves and their party. It argues that the audience of the potential 
voter dictated Liberal rhetoric because its vagueness meant that the party needed to both 
construct it and appeal to it. The nature of its target audience was unclear and continuously 
debated within the party. The Liberals therefore conceived their audience as broadly-based to 
identify as much common ground for appeal as possible. 
The second chapter considers framing and rhetorical acts of definition and construction, 
exploring the relationship between rhetoric and context. It argues that the Liberal Party 
constructed a values-based frame in the 1960s predicated on principles of partnership, before 
re-deploying those values as the solution to a frame based on a depiction of politics-in-crisis in 
the 1970s. The chapter contends that frames need to be foregrounded in rhetorical analysis for 
two reasons. Locating the frames deployed by political parties reveals both what the parties 
consider as the important issues of the time, and how they present their version of those issues 
to the electorate.  
The third chapter analyses Liberal out-of-election-time campaigns to interrogate differing 
appeals to internal and external audiences and the debate surrounding the rhetorical situation. 
The chapter argues that these campaigns aimed to create moments for Liberal progress outside 
of elections, to pursue the organisational and financial imperatives particular to it as a smaller 
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party. Through attempting to capture particular moods and using the language of action, the 
party defined situations to convince both Liberals and non-Liberals that it was the opportune 
time for action for the Liberal cause.  
The thesis therefore concludes that using a rhetorical frame of analysis reveals a lot about the 
aims and activities particular to the Liberal Party as a third and centre party between 1959 and 























Chapter One: Appeals to ethos and the potential Liberal voter 
Throughout 1959 to 1974, the Liberal Party Organising Committee’s strategy discussions were 
primarily concerned with the party’s image as it was received by the electorate.47 This was an 
especially pressing matter for the party because it recognised that the middle ground of British 
politics was an area perceived to be broad and vague. The personalised, caring image it decided 
to project was organised around the construction of the potential Liberal voter, an essential 
rhetorical act for a third party with a limited core support base. This chapter explores the 
construction of and appeals to Liberal voters by connecting the theories of Aristotle and 
Kenneth Burke to Liberal Party rhetoric for the first time and showing how this imagined 
audience was both implicit in, and itself a part of, many of its other appeals. 48 
In particular, this chapter explores how the Liberals used appeals to ethos in order to appeal to 
the electorate in elections between 1959 and 1974, identifying three distinct aspects. It analyses 
the Party’s presentation of itself “personally”, considering its depiction of individual 
candidates, the Liberal contingent as a whole, senior figures or party leaders as well as its 
presentation of itself as a party with particular local emphasis. It then looks at the party’s 
political presentation of itself, exploring its desire to assert political credibility. In doing so, it 
builds on Burke’s suggestion that appeals to ethos are a basis from which further arguments 
can prove persuasive. The final section explores Aristotelian conceptions of ethos to study how 
Liberals used their rhetoric to construct and appeal to their potential voter.  
This chapter argues that ethos appeals were borne from the particular challenge for a minor 
party to establish credibility with a positive image and full policy programme, and that 
considerations of the implied audience of the potential Liberal voter fundamentally shaped its 
rhetoric. The Liberals emphasised the importance of the personal, because most of their votes 
resulted from individual candidates’ local popularity, and constructed a defined party image 
rooted in a clear political position to build credibility. That image was dictated by Liberal 
perceptions of its potential voter and so this chapter reaffirms the importance of audience in 
appeals to ethos. Liberal core support was minimal and so it needed to imagine and construct 
a broad catchment to appeal to in order to attract votes on a large scale. This construction was 
 
47 ‘Organising Committee minutes’, Liberal Party 5/1 and Liberal Party 5/2, Liberal Party Archive (LPA), LSE 
Library. 
48 Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric (Translated with an introduction and notes by H. C. Lawson-Tancred) (London: 
Penguin, 1991); K. Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969).  
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rooted in desirable characteristics such as compassion, and was consistently broad to identify 
with the attitudes of as many potential voters as possible.  
Election Addresses 
This chapter studies individual constituency election addresses for both general and by-
elections between 1959 and 1974, consulting a comprehensive selection spanning the whole 
period and country.49 These are an invaluable source because they were delivered to every 
household in a constituency and were considered electorally essential, as a party’s easiest way 
of accessing voters. Gallup polls asserted their widespread reading with fifty three percent of 
electors claiming to have read an address in the 1970 election.50 Around a quarter of the 
permitted constituency expenditure would be consumed in their production.51  
The limited historiography on election addresses has implied that local and personal foci were 
more important in Liberal party rhetoric than other parties, but such implications have not been 
unpacked further.52 Addresses typically covered a whole range of national and local issues with 
a variety of appeals. Advice from the central party organisation was general.53 Candidates could 
consult specimen segments or entire addresses but individual variation was strongly 
encouraged. Personal and local focus was demanded, which combined with the call for credible 
and coherent policy to consolidate appeals to ethos.54  
The typical format of the addresses reflected the perceived importance of the personal. A 
personalised message from the candidate beseeched the elector for their vote and usually 
included a personal introduction, incorporating details of their family, work, political record, 
and any local ties. Photographs of candidate and family were also typically included, and the 
spouse might also offer some additional text. There was minimal and vague handbook guidance 
available on the presentation of the Party politically.55 However, the middle pages of the 
standard four-page election address often took identical forms in detailing policy, reflecting 
some centralised advice.56 In practice, this was often a condensed version of the manifesto. The 
leeway afforded here reflected both the importance for the Liberals of the personal touch of the 
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50 D. Butler and D. Kavanagh, The British General Election of February 1974 (London: Macmillan, 1974), 229. 
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candidate and the independence they were granted by the Party. In these ways, then, election 
addresses were crucial to party, candidate and elector and their variety of content offers an 
important opportunity to analyse Liberal appeals to ethos.  
Ethos and Audience 
The long-debated nature of “ethos” is crucial to this chapter. Often a quite simple definition is 
adopted, focused on the character of the orator. Crines, for example, has argued that ethos is 
about establishing ‘credibility’ to create ‘rhetorical integrity’, and that ‘without such credibility 
an audience cannot be convinced of the argument’.57 Crines implies that the specific audience 
is important, but his work focuses on the orator and their acts alone. This approach stems from 
a reading of Aristotle, who claimed that speakers need to establish themselves as credible, 
possessing common sense and goodwill.58 In particular, this thesis investigates Burke’s 
contention that ethos had the purpose of ingratiating the speaker to the audience, from which 
basis the audience could be persuaded of the overall argument.59  
Ethos is thus easily considered as the presentation of one’s sound character. However, Aristotle 
actually put forward a more complex definition than traditionally interpreted. For him, appeals 
to ethos were about locating characteristics within one’s audience and shaping your appeal 
accordingly. In his Art of Rhetoric, Aristotle explained how a speaker might adapt his appeal 
based upon the age of the audience he was addressing, for example.60 Rhetoric is not an 
ignorant construction, but one necessarily led by the characteristics of the audience. This 
encourages a historian undertaking rhetorical analysis to pay closer attention to the 
relationships between ethos appeals and audiences. Burke also centred the importance of 
audience in his theory of identification.61 For him, the task of a rhetor is to identify an element 
of common ground with your audience. This basis forms a rapport and facilitates further 
persuasion about the element of the rhetor’s concern. Before that is possible, the specific 
audience in question must be imagined and constructed. The analysis below builds on these 
traditional understandings of ethos by considering the connection between implied audiences 
and ethos appeals. It argues that the fact that rhetoric is (at least) a two-way interaction has not 
been acknowledged sufficiently in historical application of rhetorical theory. 
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Frank Myers has considered the place of audience in rhetorical theory. In his piece on Harold 
Macmillan’s “Winds of Change” speech, he combined political science approaches with 
rhetorical criticism to analyse how Macmillan sought to deal with competing audiences and in 
doing so explored techniques such as agenda-setting and dissociation to consider how orators 
dealt with political problems.62 The piece is instructive in demonstrating how orators must 
construct their ideas in such a way that they can be presented satisfactorily to multiple, often 
hostile audiences. His crucial emphasis on audience encourages further consideration of the 
Liberal Party’s construction of their audience: the potential voter.  
The personal presentation of candidates 
Appeals to ethos based on the personal presentation of the candidates appeared consistently in 
election addresses across the period and nation. These took various different forms: the 
personality of the candidate – and, often, the spouse – was underlined, particularly notable or 
successful candidates were especially spotlighted, the character and suitability of the Liberal 
contingent as a whole was stressed, and the importance of the local was constantly referenced. 
Such themes were demanded by the central party organisation, as seen in the Candidates’ and 
Agents’ Handbook of 1963, calling for photographs, biography, and personalisation; the 
personal was clearly stressed.63 The party’s Organising Committee wanted to demonstrate that 
the party had ‘the right type and age of personalities’.64 The implication was that some sort of 
personal emphasis was considered a necessary rhetorical basis for a candidate to establish a 
positive impression and ingratiate the reader.  
This emphasis on the personal was logical. In voting Liberal at this time you were voting for 
an individual MP rather than for the party of government and the party embraced this fact. 
Focusing on individual excellence because they were less likely to achieve a solely party vote, 
candidates therefore tried to demonstrate their own merits as an individual to represent the 
constituency, wanting to develop a personal connection with voters. Labour and Conservative 
candidates did also sometimes attempt to connect to their electors on a personal level, but on a 
smaller scale.65 Their rhetoric reflected the fact that their parties were, realistically, competing 
against each other for majority government. Often their addresses would be made up of positive 
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discussions of their party’s ‘policy’ and negative discussions of their opposition’s ‘failure’.66 
The Liberals, on the other hand, needed the personal to matter above this national debate 
because it was their best hope of winning a vote. 
 
Figure 1.1 – Sudbury and Woodbridge, 1964 – a typically personal Liberal Party election 
address.67 
Liberal addresses accordingly stressed the positive characteristics of candidates, and focused 
on honesty, integrity, and commitment, imploring electors to consider the virtues of the ideal 
Member of Parliament. As they sought for votes for an individual, that person was glorified. 
The candidates of Exeter in 1959 and Cheltenham in February 1974 both spoke of ‘devoting’ 
their life’s energies towards the Liberal case to improve the fortunes of constituency and 
country.68 The language of ‘devotion’ implied hard work, care, and passion, the implied 
argument being that time served represented commitment and thus worthiness of a vote. Other 
candidates simply listed the characteristics they could bring to Parliament. For example, 
Bedford’s candidate in 1964 promised ‘determination, success, sincerity’ and viewed himself 
as ‘a dynamo you can have for the price of an X’.69 The term ‘dynamo’ implied the candidate 
was selling himself as a product and invoked a language of technical scientific development 
that reflected the status of modernisation as a key issue in the 1964 election. In other cases, the 
importance of the candidate’s underlying character was seen in the address simply asking ‘what 
sort of MP do you want?’.70 The assumption underlying this rhetoric was that electors cared 
about the personal character of the candidate. Liberal rhetoric was creating a virtuous circle, 
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asserting that the personal mattered through repeated appeals to the personal virtues of 
candidates. 
Candidates that were especially notable were awarded even greater personal emphasis within 
their addresses. These could be national celebrities, famous by-election winners, or simply 
sitting MPs. For example, the address of Robin Day in Hereford in 1959 began with the 
statement that Day, a political interviewer and commentator, was ‘known to millions’.71 
Similarly, Ripon by-election winner David Austick was lauded for that success as in October 
1974 he now needed ‘no introduction…because you’ve seen him here, there and everywhere’.72 
The implication was that national or local fame was a sufficient character reference for 
Parliament. Fame (for positive reasons) brought credibility, as did simply knowledge of a 
person and association of them with politics. Other addresses provided supplements 
spotlighting the candidate. In 1964, a sixteen-page booklet to ‘Know Your Man’ (Lord Mayo) 
accompanied the Dorset South election address.73 The 1966 Bodmin address reproduced near-
verbatim a Peter Bessell parliamentary speech on the fortunes of Cornwall.74 The implicit logos 
here was that Bessell was the authority on Cornish affairs, best placed to represent the region. 
Addresses like these almost acted as independent candidate’s addresses rather than promoting 
the Liberal Party; they were very clear that an individual was being voted for. Emphasising a 
well-known candidate’s credentials was therefore one route to closing the credibility gap 
between minor and major party status. 
The Liberals also asserted the positive character of a candidate through the endorsement of 
their spouse, adding another favourable layer to the candidate’s image. These testimonia had a 
dual focus. The spouse often simply affirmed the good character of the candidate. In the address 
for Mid Beds in 1966, a short paragraph from the candidate’s wife asserted that he had ‘very 
practical’ knowledge, was an ‘ardent campaigner’, and could ‘champion’ local interests.75 
Often in the case of a female spouse, she would also offer a housewife or mother’s perspective 
to affirm the broad extent of interests that her husband could defend. The spouse promoting the 
candidate in Guildford in 1959 asserted that she could impart to her partner ‘the difficulties and 
problems…of raising a family’, before addressing some policy points on childcare and 
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schooling.76 Such segments portrayed the candidate as more widely knowledgeable, caring, 
and willing to defend a larger cross-section of their constituents’ interests. Importantly, these 
practicalities of knowledge tied in to Liberal appeals of care for all; the virtues here were those 
which the implied audience was imagined to value, too. The love of a husband for his wife 
would appear irrelevant to politics, but it reflected the Liberal focus on the personal and added 
another thin layer of positive impression of the individual candidate for whom the vote was 
sought.  
As well as individual candidates, though, some addresses also sought to lift up the character 
and capabilities of the Liberal contingent as a whole, or specifically the Liberal leaders – Jo 
Grimond and Jeremy Thorpe, for whom praise was often effusive. The importance of the leader 
as figurehead in a small parliamentary party was evidently appreciated. The candidate for 
Exeter in 1959 considered Grimond to possess ‘one of the outstanding personalities of the 
generation’, being ‘vigorous and farseeing’; he went on to underline his credentials as a 
potential Prime Minister or Leader of the Opposition. 77 Leadership qualities were boiled down 
to hard work and logic. Fifteen years on, the candidate for Rugby spoke similarly about then-
leader Thorpe, contending that ‘only’ he ‘could harness the energies and skills’ necessary to 
deal with the current political and economic crisis.78 The desired and required leadership 
qualities were being deliberately focused on characteristics rather than experience, as logical 
for a party with no recent government term. General praise for the wider Liberal Party 
contingent was used too. A boldened slogan on Cheadle’s 1966 address proclaimed ‘we have 
the people and the policies’.79 The October 1974 address for Harwich also made reference to 
the make-up of the party, as it ‘consists of free men from the whole spectrum of society’.80 This 
statement held further implications. It referred to the freedom of Liberals in Parliament to vote 
according to their conscience, as opposed to the masses of whipped Labour and Conservative 
MPs. This freedom suggested an ability to act honestly and with integrity in politics. The 
second half of the quote argued that the Liberal contingent could consider a whole range of 
interests – in contrast to arguments concerning the Conservative and Labour parties who were 
claimed to be held ransom to the interests of big business or trade unions respectively.81 Such 
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appeals sought to establish the wider electoral credibility of the Liberal Party, rather than 
simply extolling the character of a specific constituency candidate.  
A final tactic used was to eulogise the local. This involved emphasising that a candidate was 
local, acclaiming a constituency, or pledging to prioritise specifically local issues. Any local 
connections were stressed, nearly without fail. In 1964, Bolton West went slogan-heavy to 
portray this message regarding candidate Arthur Holt: ‘you know, he’s the man’; ‘one of us for 
all of us’; and ‘the man you know’.82 The assumption was that the audience would or should 
care about local issues in general elections. Emlyn Hooson for Montgomeryshire in 1966 went 
a step further, equating localness with local knowledge and passion to demonstrate the 
expertise and fervour with which he could represent the constituency.83 The importance 
attributed to a candidate’s own constituency was also portrayed in various ways. For example, 
the candidate for St Albans in 1959 spoke of his ‘great honour’ to stand in a city boasting 
visitors from across the globe;84 a common trope, as with Oxford in 1966, was to hope for local 
fame by encouraging a Liberal vote to make an electoral statement and ‘make [your 
constituency] the headline’;85 and the candidates for both Aberdeenshire West and 
Worcestershire South spoke of ‘neglect’ of their constituencies in Parliament.86 It was an 
obvious ploy for the Liberals to attribute dissatisfaction to the Conservative and Labour parties’ 
recent terms in government and implied an audience valuing local attention. 
Specific local issues were often highlighted by candidates wishing to appeal to electors’ 
particular grievances. As shown in Figure 1.2 below, Grimond devoted a considerable amount 
of his 1959 address to ‘A Plan for Orkney’ which incorporated agriculture and transport 
policy.87 In 1964 the candidate for Altrincham and Sale expressed his dissatisfaction at plans 
for a bypass around the towns being halted88 and, as common for this type of appeal, the address 
for Berwick-upon-Tweed in 1970 sought to make clear that Alan Beith was the man to get 
Berwick’s problems heard at Westminster.89 This call for a ‘voice’ rather than a ‘solution’ was 
more common in rural constituencies, trying to latch onto dissatisfaction regarding 
parliamentary neglect of agricultural issues. Attempts to reduce politics from the national to 
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the local were common. This helped to differentiate the Liberal appeal in teasing out specific 
dissatisfaction and gave the party credibility for believing in the importance of local grievances. 
It was easier to display care when discussing something specific and local than something 
vague and distant and reflected arguments of representing all interests. The candidate for 
Newcastle-under-Lyme in 1970 linked the language of caring with locality by declaring that 
the local mine closures ‘stink very strongly’.90 Latching on to the desire to fix local issues could 
help coax a potential vote into an actual vote. 
 
Figure 1.2 – Orkney & Shetland, 1959.91 
Attempts to establish that Liberal candidates and the contingent as a whole were of good 
character were key to attempts to get individual candidates elected. The Liberals used their 
rhetoric to set an agenda of personal importance. Candidates writing election addresses used a 
number of themes to personalise and localise their politics to resonate with the electorate and 
to underpin a party image of ‘caring’. The Liberals wanted to portray themselves as a personal 
and friendly party and this naturally began with a very personal presentation of its candidates. 
Aristotle’s contention that orators needed to establish themselves as possessing common sense 
and goodwill was clearly visible in this deliberate personalisation of Liberal politics, but it also 
reflects Burke’s theory of appeals to ethos as a necessary first step for a rhetorician to make a 
positive impression and have the chance to convince the audience of their further arguments 
while constructing an implied audience that valued these virtues. 
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Candidates’ presentation of the Liberal Party 
Candidates also relied upon appeals to ethos in their political presentation of the wider Liberal 
Party. Again, a number of distinct themes featured, as the party constructed a positive 
impression, of care, clarity and credibility. The Organising Committee in 1962 discussed party 
image and recognised that it was the image, more than policies, which would ‘win or lose 
votes’.92 They decided that this image must be ‘for all the people’ and ‘young, up-to-date, 
vigorous and successful’. Candidates sought to present the party as a credible producer of 
policy, with well thought-out plans arising from genuine principles. This dual notion of 
credibility and conviction was vital as appeals to logos and appeals to ethos worked as one. 
The Liberals sought to demonstrate both that they stood for something, as well as what that 
something actually was. This was essential for a minor party seeking to breach a “credibility 
gap” between it and the major parties in the eyes of the electorate.   
Candidates presented the Liberal Party as offering something new, an obvious basis on which 
to oppose the two established parties of government. They portrayed the necessity of change, 
both in policies and in politics, and contended that the Liberals were the party to carry it out. 
This contention was partly driven by a negative portrayal of “class politics” and partly by an 
argument about newness. The latter was related to the fact that the Liberals had been out of 
government for so long; the Liberal Party was not new and elsewhere it appealed to its historical 
traditions as a party of freedom. Often the party just used slogans to convey what they offered. 
The candidate for Bradford South in 1959 considered it ‘time to let the Liberals have a go!’,93 
while in East Grinstead in 1970 the appeal was that the Liberals had ‘the radical new ideas’.94 
The two main parties were alternating in government so the Liberals tried to capture a mood 
of voters wanting something different.  
The Liberals’ critique of class politics will be assessed in chapter two, but the argument about 
“newness” developed within two themes. The first was the need for policy change, usually 
centred on modernisation. Often this was expressed abstractly, such as in Beckenham in 1964 
calling for Britain to be ‘brought up to date’.95 More concretely, the candidate for St Albans in 
1959 argued against Tory and Labour ‘restrictionism’ and for the Liberal Party’s ability to 
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welcome the ‘fresh wonders’ of science.96 Such themes were common in the 1960s.97 They tied 
into the second argument: that there was something intrinsically wrong with how politics was 
being done, and that fundamental political change was necessary before fundamental policy 
change could occur. This argument took different forms: MPs were out of date and incapable 
of looking forward98 and their moral standards had deteriorated99 to the extent that Parliament 
needed a ‘blood transfusion’100 or ‘facelift’.101 The Liberals linked such issues to the two main 
parties and their creation of class divisions. The candidate for Bridgwater in 1966 called for a 
‘fresh approach to politics’ which would ‘treat people as people’ rather than ‘as cogs in a 
machine to be manipulated’.102 In the same election the candidate for Huddersfield West pinned 
blame on the ‘sterile class war’.103 The constant trope of the Liberals having ‘no vested 
interests’ depicted them as inherently the only party who could end the damaging class-driven 
politics.104 There was slight variation across the period, but the need for intrinsic political 
change was constantly portrayed. This was led by political exigency. In the 1960s, Liberal 
rhetoric of newness tied into appeals for modernisation and education to meet the technological 
revolution. In the 1970s, the economic crisis led to more direct Liberal pleas for systemic 
political change to break the two-party system and unite the country. The necessity of the fresh 
Liberal alternative was presented in terms of policy, but underpinned by the need for actual 
political change, in breaking the two-party system which was presented as encouraging class 
division.105  
The Liberals wanted to substantiate such principles with the expression of a defined position 
on the political spectrum. The idea of establishing yourself as a party within this constructed 
spectrum was an accepted political practice, satisfying to electors and their understanding of 
parties. It was also another source of definition for the Liberal Party, one which made sense 
within their wider view of two-party politics as an unsatisfactory “class war”. Positioning itself 
as the centre ground between the left and right party poles was considered necessary in order 
to ‘crystallise the vague imagination of the voter’ of the Liberal Party’s political offering.106 
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Richard Toye has assessed such acts of political positioning in the presentation of ‘consensus’ 
politics after 1945, finding that rhetoricians manipulate the meaning of certain terms to change 
their perception to their benefit.107 Liberal election addresses sought to define the political 
spectrum unequivocally as having a left, centre and right, to present themselves as the only 
non-extreme electoral option. Again, these were often slogan-heavy, undeveloped claims. ‘Not 
left, not right, but straight ahead’ was common throughout the period.108 Sometimes it was 
slightly metaphorical, as with ‘please look straight ahead’ in Huntingdonshire in 1959109 or 
‘the middle is the citadel of reason’ in Inverness in 1970.110 Occasionally this was linked to the 
extreme alternatives between which the Liberal Party was sat. The candidate for Wokingham 
in 1964, for example, called on electors to ‘avoid the dangerous extremes of both Right and 
Left’,111 whilst the candidate for South Bedfordshire in February 1974 spoke of his fear of the 
forces of extremism,112 and the candidate for Cornwall North in 1966 claimed that the Liberals’ 
moderating influence in Parliament had actually pulled the Conservative and Labour parties 
into the centre-ground.113 Thus the language of the centre was consistent. It was a satisfactory 
act of political definition to contrast the extremes of left and right. Ethos and logos appeals 
were therefore interplaying to create political clarity to satisfy an implied audience which 
valued centrism and non-extreme politics.  
This idea of political definition also took a practical form. The Organising Committee agreed 
that part of the Party Programme in 1962 and 1963 was to promote the Liberals as ‘a Party with 
a policy’.114 The very possession of defined and widely-known policy and ideology was as 
important for the Liberals as what that policy and ideology actually was. The language of ‘plan’ 
and ‘principle’ was prevalent in the addresses, signalling the Liberals as ready to govern, and 
govern with conviction. They backed this up with policy detail. Almost every address had 
standardised Liberal policy in the middle pages, and some included extra leaflets, on general 
policy or in response to specific issues.115 It was a minor party imperative to prove the existence 
of a full policy plan, as well as persuade electors regarding the actual substance of that plan. 
This was very matter-of-fact and detailed to reinforce the image of confidence and competence. 
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The candidate for Oswestry in 1964 took it upon himself to justify where the money for Liberal 
policy would come from – through the formation of a Ministry of Expansion.116 This was apt 
in the context of 1960s urban planning and the desire for modernisation. A semi-common 
format for addresses was a mini-newspaper with a big double-page policy spread, with the 
example of South Bedfordshire in 1966 essentially including a condensed manifesto entitled 
‘This is Liberal Policy’ (see Figure 1.3).117 The policy detail was there if any elector wished to 
see it, and its very existence was as important for the Liberals as what it actually said. One 
textual alternative to the paper format was listing. It was demonstrated that the Liberals had 
important things to say about important issues. The address for Anglesey in February 1974 
listed ‘what Liberals say about…’ eight policy issues.118 The candidate for Hove offered a 
sixteen-point policy plan to ‘unite to beat the [economic] crisis’.119 These combined extensive 
detail with the range of issues covered, helping to evidence claims of representing all the 
people, and being politically defined – what was being said, and the fact that plenty of things 
were being said at all. A clear policy programme was therefore proffered to overcome 
vagueness in image. 
 
Figure 1.3 – South Bedfordshire, 1966.120 
Candidates presenting the Liberal Party appealed to ethos first in attempting to construct a party 
image, and second in making this image defined and credible in the eyes of the electorate. The 
Liberals sought to generate a positive and broad-reaching impression of their party, centred on 
newness and compassion. As a minor party with an unclear national image, portraying a clear 
party image and policy, with plentiful policy detail and the overt language of ‘plan’ and 
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‘principle’, was designed to prove credibility. An ‘ethos of reason’ was created, blurring the 
boundary between appeals to ethos and appeals to logos in defining the Liberal Party’s offering. 
Constructing and appealing to the potential Liberal voter 
This final section builds on the consideration of appeals to ethos by analysing the importance 
of the audience. For Aristotle, part of the appeal to ethos was to locate particular characteristics 
within your audience and shape your appeal accordingly.121 Similarly, for Burke, a crucial basis 
for rhetorical persuasion was to identify common ground with your audience.122 The Liberal 
Party had to imagine some sort of coherent audience – its potential voter – and decide how to 
appeal to it. The ‘implied audience’, or perhaps, ‘imagined, or constructed, audience’, shaped 
Liberal appeals. Locating an audience and assigning at least one characteristic to it is a vital 
part of political persuasion. Construction and appeal act as part of the same process. All parties 
need to appeal to their potential voter – it is essential to electoral advance. For the Liberals, 
however, their potential voter was more of an unknown, with the party’s only consistent belief 
being that it was large.123 It therefore focused on broad characteristics of the potential voter so 
as to encompass as large a group as possible. In different addresses this audience was a 
’progressive’ or a ‘moderate’, a caring individual, or simply disillusioned with two-party 
politics. Ultimately, the Liberals purported to identify characteristics within their audience, 
associated themselves with such characteristics, and tried to tease them out even further in their 
appeals. Liberal imagination of the potential voter shows that rhetoric is a two-way process 
between speaker and audience and makes the party’s rhetorical history a useful window 
through which to analyse the concept of an implied audience within appeals to ethos.  
The Liberal Party considered itself to have huge but fragile untapped support. Geoffrey Sell 
reflected historiographical consensus in writing that Liberal support consisted of a ‘tiny core’ 
surrounded by a far broader potential vote.124 This was an audience not trusted to act. Liberal 
rhetoric was therefore partly devoted to the practicalities of getting the vote out. The party 
wanted an early vote, to guarantee it would be cast.125 Crucially, and particularly in its lowest 
ebb of 1959, the party appealed to its potential voter to vote with conviction and follow their 
Liberal inclinations. It encouraged independence, with the candidate for Banbury in 1959 
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simply describing the vote as ‘yours’,126 and that of Aylesbury reminding their audience that it 
was a ‘secret ballot’.127 The tacit indication was that a Liberal vote might be socially shameful 
and needed further encouragement. Other similar appeals were more complex. The 1970 
candidate for Bournemouth East & Christchurch implored voters to ‘vote positively instead of 
traditionally’,128 calling for voters to be positive in voting for something, rather than simply 
against whichever of the two major parties they disliked more. Using ‘traditionally’ as a 
negative also tied into Liberal rhetoric of freshness and change. The candidate for 
Loughborough openly claimed to be of one mind with the potential voter, writing ‘Yes – the 
Liberals may have the best policy, but will I be wasting my vote? – No!’.129 Ascribing opinions 
to the potential voter, he asserted that the Liberals have the best policy, reducing the point of 
argument to simply regarding a ‘wasted vote’ – which he could then go on to dispute. He 
identified Liberal sympathies as the basis for appealing for a vote to frame a positive, 
conviction vote as logical. Candidates wrote optimistically to make the vote seem worthwhile. 
Electors in Wells in 1964 were told ‘you can have a Liberal MP if you want one’.130 Again, 
candidates sought to break down the issue by asserting a particular claim (here, that a Liberal 
could win in Wells), attempting to reduce the doubts in the mind of the potential Liberal voter. 
Thus, through presenting the simple issue of actually going out and voting Liberal in certain 
different ways, the Liberals were identifying and seeking to dispel the concerns of their implied 
audience: the “unsure potential Liberal voter”. 
Candidates presented the potential Liberal voter in a positive light, depicting them as thoughtful 
and intelligent to draw them in to actually voting. On one level, the appeal was just for a vote 
with conviction; a slogan first seen in 1964 was ‘if you think like a Liberal, vote Liberal’.131 
The appeal for conviction often took a pejorative form, especially in 1970. The Oswestry 
candidate’s message is worth repeating in full: ‘Are you going to be political sheep and trot 
into the Tory and Labour folds? Or will you have the courage and independence to register an 
effective protest by voting for me, your Liberal candidate?’132 The implied choice here was 
between a positive, active Liberal vote and a negative, passive major party vote. Votes were 
ascribed more significance than simply a vote. The party associated their potential voter with 
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intelligence. The candidate for Hampstead in 1964 praised the constituency for its ‘forward-
looking, thinking people’, before qualifying this by demanding them to ‘think – and vote 
Liberal’.133 It was a vote for the Liberals that proved your capacity for thought. In 1974, the 
Liberals were eager to produce convincing appeals based on their recent by-election success, 
with five victories in the parliament of 1970-1974. The candidate for Kensington ascribed this 
to voters having ‘the courage to vote for what they believed in’.134 A Liberal vote was 
connected to courage. Liberal candidates simultaneously constructed, and appealed to, their 
audience by imbuing the potential Liberal voter with favourable characteristics. They presented 
their audience positively in order to convey that voting Liberal revealed something 
fundamentally good about your character.  
As with the presentation of the party’s political position, Liberals also sought to define their 
audience on the political spectrum, to capture the individual voter within the broadest possible 
Liberal arc. The potential Liberal voter was progressive, moderate, a cynic, and crucially there 
were millions of them across the nation. This further buttressed arguments for optimism and 
against the wasted vote. The Liberals used polling data as gospel when it was favourable; the 
candidate for Northwich in 1959 proudly declared that ‘a recent Gallup Poll shows that 47% 
of the electorate would like to see more Liberals in Parliament’.135 The candidate for Battersea 
South explained that this support was due to electors knowing ‘that the Liberals represent 
moderate, centre opinion’;136 this was a commonly used counterpoint to the left and right of 
the two major parties. This contrast was key; in Devizes in 1966 the alternative was being a 
‘far out left-winger or a far-out Tory’.137 This polarisation aimed to scare people away from 
the major parties and into the non-extreme (and by definition huge) centre-ground where they 
supposedly naturally belonged. The presentation became broader still. ‘Millions of people from 
all sorts of places are going Liberal’ was claimed in Colne Valley in 1964;138 this entwined 
with Liberal appeals of being a catch-all party able to represent diverse interests. They capped 
this appeal with the contention that the British were naturally liberal. The candidate for 
Basingstoke in 1966 claimed that Britain was ‘liberal by tradition, instinct and behaviour’.139 
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This equation of ‘Liberal’ and ‘liberal’ expanded the presentation of the Liberal Party into 
generally positive connotations of freedom and sense. Just as Toye’s work on the rhetoric of 
‘consensus’ after 1945 demonstrated that certain terms can be defined and manipulated to the 
rhetor’s need,140 the Liberals equated ‘Liberal’ and ‘liberal’ to in turn equate it with a belief in 
individual freedom. In this way, Liberal rhetoric sought to widen its appeal to capture a broader 
section of the electorate. It presented its audience to be sat in a vast political middle-ground, to 
which the Liberal Party should have inherent appeal.  
In 1970 Liberal candidates focused on the theme of ‘care’. The Liberals assigned themselves 
the characteristic of being ‘caring’ and invited their audience to join them in such a category. 
This black-or-white invitation implied that you either voted Liberal or lacked basic human 
compassion. It stood in contrast to Liberal rhetoric deriding the Conservative and Labour 
parties as bureaucratic and apathetic.141 This was an example of Burke’s theory of identification 
in action.142 The Liberals sought to identify that they shared the characteristic of being ‘caring’ 
with their potential voter, from which basis they could appeal for the vote more empirically. 
The candidate for Basingstoke sought to reduce the decision to a single frame of reference, 
asking ‘Do you care enough to vote Liberal?’.143 The implication of a non-Liberal vote was 
clear. In Bridgwater the candidate rooted the issue of care in a context of dissatisfaction with 
the two major parties, writing ‘Are you satisfied? Liberals care. Do you care?’.144 This snappy 
and aggressive message focused attention on the issue. The Colchester candidate identified 
dislike of politics with the human quality of caring to argue that the Liberals were the 
alternative party needed to care about the individual.145 Liberal rhetoric in 1970 therefore 
sought to make ‘care’ the differentiating factor between a Liberal vote or not. Care, 
occasionally rooted tangibly in ‘for the individual’, was a basic quality of compassion for 
Liberals to identify as a broad basis of appeal.  
These appeals were underpinned by the notion that the potential Liberal voter was tired and 
dissatisfied with politics and politicians. The rhetoric presented a trend across the period from 
a general tiredness with politics in the 1960s towards dissatisfaction caused by the inherent 
nature of the two-party system dividing the nation in the 1970s. It was necessary for the third 
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party to encourage discontent, as they were seeking a fundamental political change rather than 
a mere back and forth of governments. In 1959, voters were professed to be tired with the 
political situation. The asserted context was eight years of Conservative rule and no positive 
impact from the Labour opposition. It was confidently asserted that ‘many people are tired, 
very tired of politics’146 and that ‘many of you are irritated and bored by politicians’.147 The 
candidate for Wokingham in 1959 described Tory and Labour parliamentary behaviour as 
‘ceaseless mudslinging’.148 The implied audience had higher expectations of politics than such 
petty conflict. The Liberals constructed their audience’s mood and simultaneously appealed to 
it. By 1974, a more specific trope of dissatisfaction underpinned Liberal appeals. The candidate 
for Cambridgeshire asserted that the elector should think that ‘class warfare is splitting the 
nation’.149 Liberal candidates constructed and asserted dissatisfaction by speaking of political 
and economic crisis. It was caused by ‘increasing strife and slanging’ between the two major 
parties in the Commons,150 and by subsequent ‘political malaise’.151 This left people 
‘bewildered, frightened and angry’ according to the candidate for Kensington.152 James Martin 
has written on rhetorical appeals to emotion. In asserting how their audience should feel, 
rhetors are simultaneously creating a mood and capturing that mood.153 In the 1970s Liberal 
Party rhetoric asserted a mood of public disillusion by locating issues with the two major 
parties, and encouraged this mood to be felt by as broad a group as possible. This was to 
emotionally stimulate the audience to align with the rhetor’s way of thinking. Being “tired and 
dissatisfied” with politics changed over the period from an apathy with major party government 
to a specific discontent at a class warfare-created political and economic crisis. 
This study of election addresses has revealed that imagination of their potential voter dictated 
Liberal rhetoric. This voter was simultaneously constructed and appealed to, based on a number 
of themes. The inseparability of construction and appeal reflects the importance of audience to 
rhetoric. The “implied” audience is really “imagined”, “constructed” and “appealed to”. 
Burke’s theory of identification was visible in practice in how candidates identified with their 
potential voter by drawing them into a broad house of moderate, progressive politics which 
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cared for the individual but was tired of the two major parties. Studying the implied audience 
has demonstrated that rhetorical invention is a two-way process pinned on creative imagination 
of your audience. The mystery surrounding the exact make-up of the potential Liberal voter, 
and how they might be convinced to actually vote Liberal, made this particularly poignant for 
the Liberals and thus an especially apposite lens through which to study audience.  
*** 
This chapter has demonstrated the importance of appeals to ethos as a basis for Liberal rhetoric 
between 1959 and 1974, as the Liberals sought to create a favourable image both of their 
candidates and the party. In the former, the personal was made crucial, and in the latter, the 
party recognised the minor party imperative to produce a clear and credible image. This affirms 
Burke’s thought that appeals to ethos were a rhetorical starting point to ingratiate the audience 
as to your character, from which further appeals could be made. The prioritisation of audience 
asserted by Aristotle has become clear in analysis of the “implied audience” in the Liberal case. 
Liberal rhetoric was shaped by constructing a broad political catchment area for its potential 
voter, to identify common ground for a basis of appeal, as per Burke’s theory. The Liberal case 
is particularly pertinent for studying the rhetoric of the implied audience, because of its 
unavoidable rhetorical imperatives. In rebuilding the party’s electoral position from 1959, its 
actual target audience was unclear – and repeatedly debated within the party – and its voting 
audience could not rival the Conservative and Labour parties. It was compelled to partake in a 
dual act of construction of and appeal to an imagined potential voter. Presentation of party 











Chapter Two: Liberal Party framing of itself and politics 
Scholarship on framing has largely focused on a distinct rhetorical moment in time, but this 
chapter takes the opportunity to study change over time in how Liberal rhetoric framed the 
world, to explore the two-way relationship between rhetoric and context. It analyses why and 
how the Liberal Party constructed rhetorical frames in the period between 1959 and 1974 and 
how this framing changed in that time. 
This chapter argues that the Liberal Party adjusted its frame from a values-based politics 
strongly focused on ideology in the 1960s to a solution-based politics revolving around a 
rhetorically-defined political and economic crisis in the 1970s. Driven by context, the Liberals 
reoriented their underpinning values to become part of the solution to the crisis. A nadir in 
electoral fortunes at the end of the 1950s prompted the Liberals to redefine their image and 
they began to do this based on values and ideology. When the economic and political situation 
worsened in the late 1960s, the naturally aggressive leader Jeremy Thorpe was inclined to go 
on the offensive, eventually defining the status quo as a national crisis. A case study on the 
rhetorical expression of the theme of industrial relations reinforces these arguments. By 
locating a consistent industrial policy across the period, the contrast in expression from a focus 
on the underpinning value of partnership to that value being presented as the only fix to an 
industrial relations crisis allows us to appreciate the creative agency of the rhetorical frame. 
This chapter ultimately contends that the frame should be foregrounded in rhetorical analysis 
for two reasons: frames enable the rhetor to assert a particular way of viewing the world, and 
allow the rhetor to construct their reality of a situation. 
The chapter is separated into three sections. The first section analyses the way Liberal rhetoric 
framed its politics in the 1960s, finding a values-based approach. It scrutinises this idealistic 
basis to Liberal rhetoric, and, studying leader Grimond, finds that it viewed politics through 
the principles underlying policy formation. It looks at the conception and expression of the key 
theme of the realignment of the left wing of British politics. The second section moves to lay 
out the changing historical context into the 1970s, to enable analysis of how context drove 
rhetorical change. It finds that the Liberals created and defined a context of crisis, and analyses 
the presentation of such a problem to the electorate. It studies how the Liberals looked to 
respond to the problem and sees a consistently-deployed frame format of a diagnosed problem 
countered by a proposed solution. Third, that story of change is interrogated using a case study 
on industrial relations as a rhetorical theme. It first discovers that the policy conception of 
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industrial relations remained similar throughout the period. It can then analyse contrast in 
expression to both interrogate the earlier analysis and to consider the creative power of rhetoric.  
This chapter uses a variety of sources of Liberal rhetoric, focusing on party publications and 
manifestos across the period. These are very controlled, planned forms of rhetoric intended to 
disseminate a thought-out message, ideal in considering the framing of rhetoric. The manifestos 
also valuably combine the opportunity to proffer a “mission statement” with the imperative 
context of needing to appeal electorally. Similarly, Jo Grimond’s personal publications will be 
analysed for their content and tone. Election manifestos aside, party and personal publications 
are not such ritually produced forms of political propaganda; each very creation is noteworthy.  
1960s: values underpin policy 
The central act of Liberal framing in the 1960s was to highlight the importance of values-based 
idealism in politics. Liberals framed issues in relation to a vision of an ideal society oriented 
around values such as freedom; such principles informed policy-making too. This was driven 
by context. Grimond was the new Liberal leader in a time of two-party dominance and low 
Liberal fortunes, so the party needed a new image and chose the idea of ‘progressiveness’ as 
the focus. The naturally intellectual and ideological Grimond took Liberal values and an ideal 
Liberal society as his guide, with an ideology of a realignment of the left also a guiding 
concept.154 This values-based frame was the rhetorical output the Liberals created to 
demonstrate what was important to them at this time. 
The Liberal and national context of the early 1960s allowed the Liberals to take the opportunity 
to be inwardly focused and define a new image. Two-party politics was dominant, based around 
the post-war “consensus” of a mixed economy and welfare state. 155 The Liberals were 
recovering from their electoral nadir of 1955 and this prompted acts of political redefinition.156 
As discussed by the Organising Committee in 1962, the Liberal Party had the opportunity and 
need to redefine its political image.157 William Wallace argued that with Grimond at the helm 
this new image would inevitably be predicated upon Liberal values and heavily ideological.158 
Liberal historians have also written on that ideology. According to McManus, Grimond was 
convinced that the Labour Party was in irreversible decline;159 therefore Grimond wanted to 
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move his party from the centre of the political spectrum to the left.160 Grimond perceived the 
Liberal task as to replace Labour as the progressive wing in Britain.161 This was driven by 
Grimond’s belief that the natural alignment of British politics was to pose a left-leaning 
progressive party against a right-leaning conservative party. These histories will be newly 
interrogated through studying how the Liberals framed their politics. 
The Liberal frame of idealistic values was omnipresent in party publications. Liberals Look 
Ahead (1968) had a chapter entitled ‘Liberal Values’, and stated that ‘implicit in [the whole] 
report [was]…a faith in distinctive Liberal values’.162 It read ‘We insist upon the necessity of 
idealism’, and listed values such as ‘communal duty’ and ‘individual independence’.163 The 
titles of publications were principled in nature, such as Our Aim and Purpose (1961) and The 
New Liberalism (1963).164 The first chapter of the former was ideological, discussing 
Liberalism, as opposed to the Liberal Party or policy. Crucially, such language proliferated 
more policy-oriented publications too. In Get Britain Moving With The Liberals (1963), the 
party spoke of a ‘Liberal vision’. The ‘really important thing’ was the ‘basic attitudes’ driving 
Liberal policy – these centred on an energy and willingness to help people.165 This document 
was concerned with detailing practical policy; its concluding remarks were markedly values-
based. The language of ‘values’ and assertions of their importance ran through even policy 
documents. 
The party expressed its values basis to the electorate through defining itself as ‘progressive’, 
as decided by the party’s Organising Committee in 1962.166 As Finlayson wrote, ideologies 
and ideas are received as socially specific, outward-facing expressions.167 Robinson and 
Twyman studied the framing of progressive politics in relation to David Cameron and the 
Conservative Party in 2010.168 They concluded that the term ‘progressive’ was difficult for the 
electorate to understand, just vaguely associated with change. The imperative therefore was to 
create a ‘shared understanding’ of what ‘progressive’ connoted. That same task faced the 
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Liberals in the 1960s, taking the opportunity to define an electoral image. They made 
‘progressive’ tangible on two levels in election-time rhetoric. First, in the 1964 manifesto they 
tied it to ‘radical’ to demonstrate that the Liberal Party was left-leaning but stood for all groups 
in society.169 They established at the beginning of the manifesto that ‘progressive’ and ‘radical’ 
were one-word descriptors to mean “left-wing-but-not-Socialist”. They deployed the terms for 
the sake of political definition. Second, they linked it to forward change, as argued by Joyce. 
The ‘progressive voter’ was young, middle-class and aspiring; the policies to reflect this were 
rooted in modernisation and scientific progress.170 The Liberals’ progressive thinking gave 
them the ability to seize new technological opportunities that were becoming available.171 They 
defined the period as an ‘age of abundance’ that needed to be exploited. This shows that not 
only a broad rhetorical approach or specific themes can be framed, but even individual terms. 
Studying the Liberal Party leader between 1956 and 1967, Jo Grimond, reinforces the 
prevalence of the values basis. Grimond believed ‘in the primacy of ideas’ and was driven by 
the values of ‘political Liberalism’.172 Indeed, in his own publication The Liberal Future 
Grimond made clear that policy must be dominated by weightier principles and a sketch of an 
ideal Liberal society.173 Policies were justified in principle and in practice. Devolution and 
regionalism were both underpinned by the need to ‘put power into as many hands as 
possible’.174 The stated principle was that individuals deserved to run their own lives rather 
than have every aspect managed from the centre. This was also justified more practically in 
terms of the efficiency of local management. Grimond was concerned by ‘ideas and broad 
policies’; his rhetoric underscored the importance of that point at which ideal values and 
practical policies could meet. 175 An ideal vision of society and its values underpinned both 
Grimond and the party’s rhetoric, therefore; policy was always presented alongside its 
principled justification. This was driven by both Grimond himself and the political situation. 
A key thematic organising concept within this frame was Grimond’s theory of a ‘realignment 
of the Left’ in British politics. This theme relied upon the values underpinning Liberal rhetoric. 
It allowed the party to associate the desired left wing of British politics with values such as 
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partnership and care for the individual. Ideological political alignment was the driving tangible 
theme within Liberal rhetoric. Grimond wrote extensively on this in his publication The Liberal 
Challenge. A rise in affluence and decline in class consciousness left the party system no longer 
reflecting the make-up of society; there were no longer “haves” and “have-nots”. For Grimond, 
the real division was between ‘progressives’ and ‘conservatives’.176 There was political space 
for a party based on neither capital nor labour.177 Grimond thus redefined the left as the 
‘progressive’ wing; in an election-time speech in 1964, he described Liberal and Communist 
ideals as the most totally opposed.178 For Grimond and the Liberals, therefore, political 
realignment was an electoral theme too; it dominated thinking. He wanted ‘a radical party on 
the left of the centre of politics but free of socialist dogma’; the distinction between freedom 
and authoritarianism made the Liberal Party incompatible with the traditional left wing.179 The 
party also addressed redefining the political spectrum. In Liberals Look Ahead, it wrote ‘the 
fundamental division today is…between those who are Liberal and those who are 
authoritarian’.180 This language reduced the political choice to a positive-negative polarisation. 
In this case, ideology was a theme, rather than a frame; it interplayed with this frame of a 
values-based politics, working to define the Liberal Party as a progressive party of freedom. 
Liberal Party rhetoric in the 1960s was not entirely positive and inward-facing. The theme of 
the realignment of the left (and general political positioning) did also produce more critical 
rhetoric attacking the Conservative and Labour parties. In Partners at Work (1968) – an 
industrial policy report – the party criticised the main parties ideologically, for perpetuating 
class conflict, because ‘they owe their political position to the very existence of the conflict’. 
They are ‘paid to defend’ their vested interest rather than attempt ‘to make peace’.181 The 
contrast was then made with the Liberal Party, supposedly free to search for peace in this 
supposed class conflict. This was pejorative conflict rhetoric intending to inspire anger against 
the main parties who were fundamentally depicted as the cause of division in Britain. This is a 
crucial counterpoint to note against the general trend of self-acclaiming Liberal rhetoric based 
on its own political position and values. It was the beginning of a more pejorative presentation 
of the class conflict. 
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The Liberal Party took advantage of the opportunity to define a new image for itself by 
constructing a values-based politics premised on the principles of an ideal society. These values 
centred on community and care. Liberal party rhetoric focused on the image it was creating for 
the electorate; Grimond considered the ideological position of the party. This demonstrates that 
the frame is a creative opportunity to focus on a vision of reality or of what is important that is 
favourable to a rhetor. Liberal construction of values was simultaneously an underpinning and 
an appeal. 
1970s: crisis 
This second section moves the story on to the 1970s to consider what changed in how Liberal 
Party rhetoric framed reality, and why. It again considers longer-form party publications, 
particularly the two election manifestos of 1974 and the party handbook of the same year. The 
values that underpinned Liberal rhetoric in the 1960s now became part of the solution to a 
defined ‘crisis’ of the early 1970s, caused by the Conservative and Labour parties’ inherent 
perpetuation of class conflict. National Executive Committee strategy minutes in 1969 reveal 
that the driving imperative was to lay out reasons for dissatisfaction and to demonstrate that 
the Liberals were needed to combat it.182 The party identified a ‘crisis’ and expressed it 
pejoratively, before proposing a solution of unity in the national interest. The developing 
context and subsequent electoral opportunities encouraged the problem-solution frame. 
Liberal rhetoric in the 1970s was responsive to circumstance. The decade did start in a context 
of economic downturn and popular disillusion, providing both the basis from which to 
construct a crisis, and an electoral opportunity for the Liberals to exploit. There is historical 
consensus on the worsening public mood at the turn of the decade.183 Turnout at the 1970 
general election was at its lowest since the war.184 The affluence of the 1960s raised public 
expectations and led to ‘growth optimism’ by political figures which simply could not be 
perpetuated.185 By 1974, there were more tangible symptoms of economic and political slump. 
The oil price rise by OPEC hit the British economy hard; the miners’ strike reflected growing 
social divisions; the resulting three-day working week further damaged the economy.186 This 
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dissatisfaction created the electoral opportunity for the Liberals to challenge the major parties 
who could seemingly not reverse the decline. The Party was increasingly the home of the 
protest voter by 1974.187 There is also general consensus on ‘partisan dealignment’, a theory 
of the time as well as subsequent historiography. Voters were simply no longer as strongly 
attached to the Conservative and Labour parties as in previous decades. For Cyr, this was a 
growing phenomenon, finally truly signalled by the six million Liberal votes in February 
1974.188 Crewe et al argued contemporaneously for a similar timeline. By 1974, the general 
rise in affluence, working-class conservatism and the major party dissatisfaction had made 
partisan dealignment a reality.189 The Liberals recognised the opportunity to appeal for votes 
from a larger part of the electorate.  
The first step in Liberal framing of its politics in the 1970s was to define a crisis. Atkins argued 
that the rhetorical imperative in such a situation was to define an issue and select the signs most 
likely to resonate with the target audience. The Liberals defined it in three parts: a (1) flawed 
political system dominated by class conflict was (2) suppressing the needs of the individual 
and (3) causing both economic and political crisis. Alt et al argued that the key Liberal strategy 
in the 1974 elections was to play upon dissatisfaction.190 Martin has argued that political 
speeches are about capturing a mood and emotionally stimulating one’s audience.191 Part of the 
framing of a problem, there is also the imperative to create a mood in the first place. The 
Liberals sought to capture and create a mood through their rhetoric on class conflict and the 
individual. The focus on practical grievances was then evidence to justify such a mood. 
The Liberals rather abstractly asserted the flawed political system and a public mood of 
dissatisfaction surrounding it. There was a marked change in the late 1960s in the language 
used by the party. It was forceful and aggressive. This broadly coincided with both Thorpe 
becoming leader and the British economy beginning to slump. The Liberal Party asserted a 
dissatisfaction with politics on account of the Conservative and Labour parties creating a class 
conflict: defending the interests of capital and labour respectively rather than the individual.192 
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The publication The Liberal Crusade in 1967 set the aggressive tone, declaring ‘to hell with 
politicians’.193 They attempted to capture a mood of apathy. An article by Thorpe in the Daily 
Express in June 1970 summarised the crux of the position. He argued that ‘a radical change 
[was] needed’ due to the ‘growing cynicism’ with politics.194 A political broadcast by Lord 
Byers in 1971 stated that ‘respect for politics and politicians has hit an all-time low’.195 In light 
of miners’ strikes, a similar tone persisted into 1974 as the Liberals sought to portray a severe 
crisis. Indeed, the language of ‘crisis’ was constant both in the February 1974 manifesto and in 
candidates’ addresses of the same election.196 They called for a ‘total change’ in the political 
system and later declared that the October 1974 election would ‘make or break Britain’.197 On 
one level therefore Liberal crisis rhetoric aimed to demonstrate that there was something, 
caused by main party politicians, to be angry with. It was based on assertions that apathy was 
the correct response to this supposed problem situation in British politics. 
The first symptom causing this supposed disillusion was a subjugation of the individual and its 
interests. The main parties were practising a politics of vested interests, deprioritising the 
individual. In Join The Liberal Crusade (1970), the party contended that the individual felt cut 
off from decision-making processes in government and industry.198 The language of ‘Crusade’ 
connoted a principled and passionate response to the class conflict. The election manifesto in 
1970 followed suit. Titled ‘What a Life!’, it was designed to play upon the disillusion created 
by economic decline and a lack of agency for individuals in their workplace and government.199 
Its main theme was portraying a lack of care for the individual by the Conservative and Labour 
parties, listing grievances in bullet-point format for eight pages before addressing Liberal 
policies. It sought to identify with potential voter disillusion. The theme of the individual was 
selected to exemplify a lack of care for ordinary people by the main parties. The combination 
of pejorative language and asserted severity intended to dramatize this constructed crisis and 
both generate and identify popular discontent with the two major parties. 
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In more practical terms the crisis was presented to the electorate as economic and political in 
nature. The Liberals connected these aspects by presenting the economic crisis as caused by 
the asserted class conflict. The Conservatives could not deal with industrial problems because 
they were driven by the interests of capital. The economy was declining because neither party 
could place their own vested interests to one side to end industrial conflict and reinvigorate the 
economy. This argument played on specific grievances. The early 1970s context of oil price 
rises, miners’ strikes and three-day working weeks has already been laid out.200 Inflation was 
a targeted issue. In February 1974 the Liberal Publication Department published a leaflet 
entitled ‘Stop Britain Going Bust’, which called to ‘stop the strife’.201 Even at the end of the 
previous decade, unemployment was up and house-building down.202 The Party handbook for 
1974 (published between the two elections) is a most revealing source here. Traditionally a 
matter of fact run-through of party policy, this edition pejoratively attacked the political system 
and the two major parties.203 It located ‘acute stagflation’ as proof of economic crisis and the 
eroded confidence of the electorate as proof of political crisis. It married the two by attacking 
the two-party political system of capital versus labour and, in light of the miners’ strikes, called 
for a ‘total change’ in British politics. The gap between expectation and reality of rhetoric here 
makes the rhetoric used seem abrupt and vividly demonstrates the pejorative framing of a crisis 
in Liberal rhetoric in the period.  
Liberal rhetoric in the 1970s therefore sought to be aggressive and disruptive and make an 
impression upon voters. This aligns with Joyce’s argument that the party moved from appealing 
to “progressive” voters to appealing to apathetic voters.204 The supposed ‘partisan dealignment’ 
encouraged the Liberals to focus less on the makeup of the political spectrum and more on the 
mood of the electorate. The change in audience necessitated a change in approach. They sought 
to create and capture a broader mood of disillusion. Having put their own spin on the 
contemporary discourse of crisis, the Liberals presented it to the electorate pejoratively.  
Having rhetorically constructed and presented the crisis, the Liberals then completed the 
“problem-solution” frame. Having presented the Conservative and Labour parties as the root 
cause of the class conflict-created crisis, they presented themselves as the solution. They were 
the antithesis to the class division, a contention portrayed as inherently logical. The 
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Conservative and Labour parties defended the vested interests of Big Business and Trade 
Unions; the Liberals received no such funding from one interest group and could therefore 
portray themselves as independent.205 This worked on two levels. The very nature of the Liberal 
Party was suitable to respond to the crisis as it cared for individuals over the interests of capital 
or labour; in turn it was able to identify a common goal of acting in the national interest and 
recreating national unity. Both levels functioned as fundamentally logical solutions to the 
defined crisis and their expression will be explored in turn. 
The 1974 handbook logically asserted that the Liberal Party was inherently able to respond to 
the crisis by prioritising the individual. It asserted certain policies as necessary and used the 
basis of values to explain why it could champion such policies. Social policies, such as 
increased housing development grants, were necessary to improve quality of life; the party’s 
concern for the individual allowed them to propose such a policy. The industrial conflict and 
miner’s strikes too required a solution based on the individual rather than political party or 
trade union. The party could pursue industrial policies of partnership and redistribution and 
political policies of devolution and regionalism because it was not at the mercy of any vested 
interest.206 In a press release in February 1974 Thorpe called for policies of moderation; the 
economic plight was so great that party interests must be placed aside.207 Again, the inherent 
logic was that only the Liberal Party could place such interests aside because of their 
underpinning basis of care. As seen in Chapter One, care for the individual was a particular 
theme for the Liberal Party in the early 1970s. The values that framed Liberal rhetoric in the 
1960s explained why it could solve the crisis of the 1970s. The frame was two-part: it laid out 
the solution and why the Liberals were uniquely placed to provide it. The Liberals defended 
the interests of the individual whereas the Conservative and Labour parties would always be 
subject to their vested interests – who stood at the heart of creating the crisis.    
To make these respective negatives and positives more tangible, Liberal rhetoric identified a 
common goal of national unity. Similar to Atkins finding that the coalition government of 2010 
preached responsibility in the national interest,208 the Liberals in the 1970s preached care for 
the individual to create national unity. This was presented as a fundamentally logical response 
to a crisis whose cause was defined as division (between capital and labour). The February 
1974 manifesto was designated as a ‘programme for national reconstruction’ aimed at a future 
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without class conflict or partisan bitterness.209 The October 1974 manifesto defined the only 
possible solution as ‘a new political alignment’ with parties free of vested interests.210 Main 
party interests had to be subordinated to favour those of the nation. Liberals exploited popular 
disillusion by calling for non-adversarial politics and moderation in the national interest.211 The 
language of “national reconstruction” and “national unity” was also a technique for drawing 
attention and ensuring resonance; the political and economic crisis was so serious that it 
required drastic systemic change on a nationwide scale. The defined problem and the proposed 
solution cannot be separated, as the latter was presented very logically to solve the former. 
Each contrast between present reality and future necessity was solved by something 
fundamental about the Liberal offering. That was the crux of how the Liberal Party framed its 
rhetoric in the early 1970s: a constructed problem with a directly logical solution. 
Liberal rhetoric moved from a values-based underpinning in the 1960s to a problem-solution 
frame in the early 1970s. This shows the value of the rhetorical frame as a creative tool to 
define a situation to one’s benefit. The Liberal Party rhetorically constructed a political and 
economic crisis predicated upon the major parties’ destructive vested interests of capital and 
labour which left them fundamentally incapable of solving the economic decline and industrial 
unrest. It emphasised its inherent care for the individual to demonstrate that it could act in the 
interests of national unity, which was defined as the only logical solution to problems of 
division. This logic was key. The values that Liberals used to frame their offering in the 1960s 
now formed part of the solution to crisis in the early 1970s. The Liberals used a problem-
solution narrative in the early 1970s to mould a coherent narrative whereby they had the 
inherent fix to the constructed crisis.  
The case study of industrial relations as a rhetorical theme 
The final section of this chapter considers the arguments made above through the case study of 
industrial relations and explores how its rhetorical presentation changed over the period. The 
Liberals’ policy idea of co-ownership – giving workers a greater share in their work – changed 
very little over the 1960s and 1970s. However, the policy’s presentation changed considerably, 
proving the creative agency of rhetoric to define an issue in ways to suit a wider argument. In 
the 1960s, the Liberal Party focused on the policy’s underlying principles, talking about a spirit 
of partnership and common interest and reflected the values-based frame deployed more 
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generally. The perceived consensus of a mixed economy with some planning did not entirely 
prevent debate on industrial relations (for example, debate regarding pay restraint after the 
1961 incomes policy) but the Liberals did not perceive any particular mood of mass disillusion 
to play on. The situation had reversed by the early 1970s and so the Liberals adapted their 
rhetoric. An industrial crisis was defined as inherently caused by the vested interests of the 
Conservative and Labour parties which encouraged partisanship and division. Liberal rhetoric 
manipulated the underlying values of individual and community to become the logical solution 
to provide necessary unity in industrial relations.   
Liberal policy on industry did not substantially change across the period in question. The 
consistent policy idea was co-ownership.212 Liberals claimed that employees needed a share in 
both the organisation and profit of their work to incentivise expansion.213 This was seen both 
in 1959 in Grimond’s publication The Liberal Future and again in 1974 in the ‘You Can 
Change the Face of Britain’ advert. The Liberals wanted to create a community of interests 
with joint responsibility and a share of the wealth.214 The practical output of such ideas would 
be Works Councils or bodies of worker-shareholders.215 This policy did not change from the 
1960s to the 1970s. Holding the policy ideas as consistent allows us to consider how 
contemporary context and rhetorical imperatives affect the ideas’ expression. 
The language used to portray Liberal policy on industrial relations in the 1960s was values-
based, concerned with the principles underlying the policy. Liberals associated their industrial 
policy with defending the interests of the individual worker and creating a spirit of partnership 
in industry. In Partners at Work (1968), the party lamented the ‘alienation of the worker from 
his work’.216 This was a continuation of the theme of ‘People Count’ which proliferated Liberal 
rhetoric through the 1960s.217 Liberals treated industrial policy as an issue of the individual. A 
larger say for the worker in his work – through, for example, Works Councils – was predicated 
upon enhancing personal freedom.218 The policy of co-ownership was also designed to promote 
common interest in industry, which stemmed ‘from a belief in the brotherhood of man’.219 
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Language such as ‘alienation of the worker from his work’ and ‘brotherhood of man’ implied 
that the Liberals were thinking very fundamentally about industrial relations and how the 
individual should be placed within it. There was a recognised need for a spirit of cooperation 
in industry to enhance production and incentivise expansion.220 The language used to present 
industrial policy in the 1960s consistently reflected the dual values of individual reward and 
community interest. As reflective of wider Liberal rhetoric in the 1960s, the party defined its 
policies’ underlying principles. In industrial relations too, therefore, Liberal rhetoric saw larger 
ideals as crucial and related the specific policy to them to make them agreeable. 
By the 1970s, the Liberals treated the theme of industrial relations as symbolic of the wider 
crisis which they sought to construct. The industrial situation in Britain was said to reflect the 
issues of extremism and partisanship which drove the crisis of economic downturn and social 
division.221 There was something fundamentally wrong with the Conservative and Labour 
parties and their vested interests and this was exemplified by the industrial situation in Britain 
where those duelling interests of capital and labour truly came to tension. There were hints of 
this more aggressive industrial rhetoric in the 1960s. In Grimond’s personal publication The 
Liberal Challenge (1963), he identified a destructive ‘two-sides’ attitude, indicating a 
damaging class conflict.222 In the 1970s, the language of conflict became starker. Thorpe 
claimed in 1971, ‘we have to stop industry being a battlefield’.223 Even by 1968, the strike 
record of British industry was worsening;224 in the early 1970s there was increasing public 
dissatisfaction that Heath could not resolve conflict with the Trade Unions and internal division 
regarding In Place of Strife showed that the Labour Party was also conflicted.225 Liberal 
rhetoric reflected the wider problem-solution format of appeal. Industrial conflict was 
presented as inevitably prolonged by the Conservative and Labour parties; only the Liberal 
Party of no vested industrial interests could offer the solution. It thus connected the economic 
and political system by defining this as a wider issue of leadership. The values that underpinned 
industrial policy in the 1960s became the fundamental reasons why the Liberals could solve 
industrial crisis in the 1970s. 
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The industrial situation was explosively laid out by the Liberals in their Daily Express advert 
of February 1974, ‘You Can Change The Face Of Britain’.226 The controversial advert depicted 
a picture of Jeremy Thorpe, apparently speaking passionately, in front of the faded faces of 
Conservative and Labour leaders Heath and Wilson. Its very existence was disruptive because 
it challenged previous electoral etiquette by using newspaper advertising in election-time; its 
legality was dubious but accepted. At face value it was simply a jarring appeal for drastic 
political change at the upcoming election. The term ‘Face’ was used both to suggest that it was 
simply time for a new leader and party in British politics, but also to imply something more 
fundamental: that Britain needed a transformative systemic change.  
 
Figure 3.1 – You Can Change The Face Of Britain.227 
The content of the text below the picture condemned the Conservative and Labour parties for 
their handling of the industrial situation. The Conservatives had created an ‘industrial 
atmosphere’ where cooperation with the Unions was impossible and Labour had ‘stoked the 
fires of industrial division’ to attack the Conservatives. This vivid language apportioned the 
blame for the present industrial problems to the two major parties. The problem was 
fundamental. The Conservatives could only act on the side of Big Business and Labour could 
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only defend the Unions. Portrayal of the solution used very similar language, as the Liberal 
Party was said to ‘have consistently stood for partnership between Capital and Labour in 
industry’. The logic of contrast was clear. The values of partnership and community established 
in 1960s rhetoric on industrial relations now provided the solution to industrial division. The 
rhetoric of principle was deployed to positive effect. Thorpe claimed in the advert that ‘we do 
not believe in industrial confrontation’ and ‘we do not believe in perpetuating the class 
struggle’. A memo to all Liberal candidates and officers by Thorpe in February 1974 showed 
this to be the key focus for appeal. He encouraged candidates to ‘emphasise the appalling 
climate of confrontation’ in industry and to remember that ‘the government believe 
unashamedly in class warfare’.228 By 1974, the Liberals were deliberately weaponising the 
language of principle.  
The rhetorical treatment of industrial relations exemplified the shift in Liberal framing of 
politics from the 1960s to the 1970s. Industrial policy did not change, remaining focused on 
co-ownership, the involvement of a worker in both the organisation and profits of his work, but 
the rhetoric did. The values-based frame of the 1960s which underpinned Liberal industrial 
policy became part of the solution to the defined industrial crisis in the 1970s. A spirit of 
community and partnership, the 1960s justification for Liberal industrial policies of co-
ownership, became the reason why the Liberals could solve the industrial division inherently 
created by Conservative and Labour. This was entirely reflective of their wider definition of 
problems in British politics. This proves the creative agency of framing to manipulate 
perceptions of a situation to your benefit by presenting similar content in contrasting ways.  
*** 
This chapter has argued that Liberal values of partnership, set up as the basis for Liberal policy 
in the 1960s as the party sought to establish a fresh image in the context of low electoral 
fortunes, were deployed as the solution to a crisis in the 1970s when the economic situation 
worsened and dissatisfaction with the two major parties increased. This proves the power of 
rhetoric to interact with context and manipulate ideas in different necessary ways, 
demonstrating the agency of the rhetorical frame.  
This chapter affirms the need for rhetorical analysis to consider frames as part of the rhetorical 
process for two key reasons. First, they are a crucial tool in underpinning a way of viewing the 
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world and asserting what is important. Second, they allow a rhetor to present their reality of a 
situation and construct a definition to their benefit. They are used to shape rhetoric by 
grounding a point of view from which rhetorical appeals are made. The contrast in Liberal 
framing between the 1960s and the 1970s shows how rhetors deploy frames differently to 
respond to new contexts and perceived exigencies. The Liberal Party shifted from rebuilding 
its offering by defining its political image to attacking the major parties in pursuit of electoral 
breakthrough. It thus wanted to present contrasting ways of viewing the state of British politics 
and its place within it. Its deployment of frames first predicated on values and later predicated 





















Chapter Three: The in-between times tool: the mid-cycle campaign 
This final chapter turns its attention to the Liberal Party’s “out-of-election-time” or “mid-
cycle” campaigns. These campaigns lasted weeks, months or years and were crucial non-
election time activity to increase party membership or constituency election readiness. They 
were prominent in strategy discussions within the party but have received scant scholarly 
coverage, save the occasional reference in longer party studies of the period.229 Studying these 
campaigns offers us an important new perspective on the contexts and imperatives that shaped 
rhetoric outside the rituals of electioneering. The Liberal Party chose to run particular 
campaigns at particular times aimed at particular audiences, so we can study the rhetorical tools 
used for this type of rhetorical activity. Considering campaigns and strategy discussions 
reminds us that political party rhetoric is a constant process rather than an election-cycle ritual. 
They are also a window into particular third-party imperatives. For example, the need to retain 
press coverage outside of election periods was an especially pressing motivation for the 
Liberals. The imperative was to grab attention and make continuous political progress. This 
was especially pertinent with the weaker financial and organisational position of the Liberal 
Party.230 Outside of elections the party needed memberships and money. It could not afford 
electorally nor financially to be out of sight and out of mind for four years of every five. 
There were four key mid-cycle campaigns in the period 1959 to 1974. They were: the ‘Call to 
Action’ campaign of 1961;231 the ‘Tell the Nation’ campaign of 1963;232 the ‘Autumn 
Campaign’ of 1965;233 and ‘Join the Liberal Crusade’,234 running over four years from 1967. 
These predominantly leaflet campaigns were targeted at audiences inside and outside of the 
Liberal Party. Various executive committees of the Party discussed the intentions and 
organisation of the campaigns and these strategy minutes are considered alongside the 
materials produced for the campaigns.  
The chapter uses this material to argue three points about Liberal rhetoric between 1959 and 
1974. Firstly, it claims that by neglecting mid-cycle campaigns historians have underestimated 
the extent to which the Liberal Party’s rhetorical activity was organised in pursuit of particular 
organisational, membership and financial imperatives. An important dimension of Liberal 
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rhetoric was using campaigns to make political progress outside the framework of winning 
seats at elections. Secondly, the chapter shows that campaigns attempted to achieve this by 
creating particular moments of opportunity to inspire action in both internal and external 
audiences. The specialised appeals deployed to create those moments and inspire action were 
just as important a part of Liberal rhetoric as those associated with election hustings or 
parliamentary debate. Thirdly, appeals differed to these internal and external audiences but 
both were part of the same rhetorical situations that the Liberal Party attempted to create. The 
perceived rhetorical task was to create a moment for Liberal progress, and the contrasting 
appeals were a means to achieving this in relation to the two specific types of audience. 
This chapter uses analysis of mid-cycle campaigns to interrogate two existing literatures. First, 
it considers the debate on the “rhetorical situation”.235 This is a welcome opportunity to do this 
because, even if campaigns are ultimately responses to perceived contexts, they are still a less 
ritualised form of political activity. The classic debate on the rhetorical situation was 
constructed between Bitzer and Vatz. The former argued that certain situations demand a 
certain rhetorical response.236 Such situations have certain elements which determine the 
rhetoric that is called for. For Bitzer, these elements are an exigence (at least one organising 
imperative), an audience to be targeted, and constraints – unavoidable facts that the rhetor must 
work within. Indeed, ‘a work is rhetorical because it is a response to a situation of a certain 
kind’. However, Vatz argued that Bitzer was removing agency from the rhetor with this 
conception. He contended that ‘situations obtain their character from the rhetoric’.237 It is the 
rhetor who constructs a situation, in how they define it or respond to certain chosen exigencies.  
Bitzer and Vatz were writing in the 1970s and considering American examples, but it 
nevertheless prompts thought about the extent to which rhetoric is a creative act. We reconsider 
this debate in the context of the less ritualised out-of-election campaign. James Martin has 
intervened in the debate by considering rhetorical strategy.238 As a product of strategising, 
rhetoric is an active response to a situation. It uses arguments situated at a particular point in 
time to impact the audience in a desired way. Viewing Liberal Party committee minutes related 
to the campaigns allows us to consider the place of strategising within the rhetorical process. 
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Centring party strategy in our analysis in this chapter lets us consider the formulation of both 
the situation and the response. This chapter therefore uses scholarship on the rhetorical 
situation to reflect on the out-of-election campaign and consider two interlocking themes: 
rhetoric as a creative act, and the importance of party strategising.  
The chapter also considers the work of Katherine Dommett, who located a distinction between 
public (external) rhetoric and party (internal) rhetoric.239 The former is aimed at audiences 
external to the party and might be a manifesto or a leader’s speech; the latter is aimed at 
audiences within the party and might be an internal memo. The campaigns considered here 
suggest that the format is not so distinct. Dommett arrived at this conception through looking 
beyond the party leader to study party ideology. She looked for points of ideological conflict 
or consensus within parties and sought to understand the cause of any difference. This chapter 
takes inspiration from this more holistic view of political party rhetoric. Dommett did argue 
that ‘rhetorical strategies for persuasion differ depending on context’.240 The campaigns, aimed 
at various audiences inside and outside the party, are ideal for interrogating this claim in a 
specific Liberal context as a third party with particular imperatives for these different 
audiences. In assessing the rhetoric of the mid-cycle campaigns, then, the chapter compares the 
audiences targeted; the appeals used to these audiences; and the differing imperatives 
underlying such appeals. In the process, it shows that Dommett’s theoretical distinction 
between public and party rhetoric can usefully be applied to better understand specific episodes 
of historical rhetoric.   
Background to the Campaigns 
The Call to Action campaign of autumn 1961 was a ten-week nationwide membership drive.241 
Announced at the 1961 Liberal Party Assembly, Jo Grimond called for 100,000 new members 
to lay the foundation for a future push for government.242 The stated context was of Liberal 
optimism. Liberal support was gradually trending upwards;243 there were opportunities to 
exploit dissatisfaction with a decade of Conservative rule and Labour divisions on nuclear 
disarmament.244 The Liberals aimed to enrol supporters ‘as members, workers, and subscribers’ 
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in order to offer the electorate a credible, nationwide, radical party.245 The Party anticipated an 
election in the second half of 1963 and targeted the adoption of 450 candidates.246 The key 
literature attached to the campaign was twofold. A Call to Action campaign leaflet was 
circulated to local constituency associations explaining the appeals underpinning the campaign 
and how to run it practically.247 These associations were to distribute contact cards to homes 
and subsequently make return calls. The party also released a booklet for wider public 
consumption. This was entitled Take Britain Ahead and was a repurposed production of 
Grimond’s 1961 assembly speech, with additional comments and explanations included.248  
The Tell the Nation campaign ran across 1962 and 1963 in two parts. It began with a campaign 
targeting Labour voters in which over 600,000 leaflets were distributed. 249 The second part 
was entitled ‘Get Britain Moving with the Liberals’ and was aimed at local opinion leaders and 
potential Liberal “influencers”;250 it this part that will be analysed here. The party published a 
sixteen-page booklet called Get Britain Moving with the Liberals.251 It incorporated a personal 
message from Jo Grimond, setting out the Liberal plan for growth and calling these targeted 
opinion leaders to action. As ever, the Liberal Party context was dominated by a need to 
continue ‘the Liberal advance’ with progress electorally and organisationally.252 The asserted 
national context was twelve ‘failed’ years of Conservative rule, and the Labour opposition, 
‘divided and reactionary’, deemed unfit to provide a solution.253 The Liberals’ imperatives 
were driven by a chance to present and exploit a medium-term electoral opportunity. They 
sought to invigorate action in individual constituencies to build up their election-time front. 
They had adopted 338 prospective candidates by February 1963 but would only add to the list 
if a constituency was organisationally ready to fight an election. In this campaign they wanted 
to reach between 200 and 500 community leaders in each constituency and eventually located 
around 25,000 nationally.254 
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The Autumn Campaign of 1965 was two-pronged in intention. It aimed to turn ‘Liberals into 
Members’ and ‘Members into Workers’.255 The Liberals subsequently had differing 
organisational and electoral imperatives, bound together under one stated aim: to ‘stimulate 
militant Liberalism’ across Britain.256 A leaflet entitled Autumn Campaign 1965 was sent out 
to local associations to encourage campaign action.257 The Liberals also published a leaflet for 
the public, Liberal for a real change, to attack the Conservative and Labour parties for failing 
to bring about change in government.258 The main thrust was in defining a context of the 
Conservatives providing no change, and Labour providing short change.259 They therefore 
asserted a Liberal opportunity to offer real change. The campaign was again geared towards a 
supposedly imminent general election in which the Liberals would continue this appeal for real 
change.260 
The final Liberal campaign of the 1960s was the Liberal Crusade. It begun in 1967 and was set 
to run over four years until the next general election, believed likely to be in 1970 or 1971.261 
The Liberals pursued every imaginable imperative. They continued their exhortative appeal for 
votes from the Liberal sympathiser; they pursued the organisational imperatives of increasing 
local activity and converting “members” into “active members”; and they launched an appeal 
for one million pounds to fund the party’s push for government. The Liberals begun the 
campaign soon after the start of Jeremy Thorpe’s leadership, in the context of fluctuating 
fortunes for the party. Two leaflets formed the crux of the campaign. The party published the 
leaflet The Liberal Crusade: People Count to launch the campaign in 1967.262 It was subtitled 
‘The Liberal Plan for Power’. The party used it to lay out the purpose of the campaign, targeting 
each imperative. The second key leaflet, entitled Join the Liberal Crusade, ostensibly targeted 
the potential voting public but appealed within the party too.263 It reiterated the call for 
donations, appealing for one million pounds to allow the Liberal to prepare for government and 
explaining the organisational imperatives that an influx of money would aid.  
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Attracting New Recruits Between Elections 
The Liberal Party needed to gain support from external audiences even when it would not be 
immediately expressed as a vote, to build up a party whose membership numbers could not 
rival the two major parties between 1959 and 1974. Much of its campaign rhetoric, therefore, 
was outward-facing, seeking to attract new party members. The Liberals responded to the 
problem of mobilising a public that was not primed for political engagement by using the 
language of action and constructing the present as an “opportune moment”. They conveyed 
optimism and ambition, and deployed a series of metaphors to argue that the main ingredient 
lacking was the manpower of potential Liberals joining the party. They also used more 
traditional negative and positive appeals. The former were based on the language of frustration 
and a need for change. The latter were more issue-based and focused on, for example, education 
policy, or the role of the individual. The rhetoric produced was attuned to the exigencies of the 
mid-cycle campaign. 
We can see this mid-cycle rhetoric in the Call to Action campaign of 1961, a recruitment drive 
intended to ‘increase membership substantially’.264 The party produced a booklet entitled Take 
Britain Ahead targeted at non-Liberals, available both for local associations to purchase in bulk 
and disseminate, or individuals to buy.265 Three key themes were used to capture public interest 
and support. Firstly, it lay a basis of optimism predicated on the ‘many thousands of new 
Liberals throughout the country’.266 The optimism Grimond sought to present in the 
introduction to his speech was signposted by the in-text annotation, ‘Doubt and 
faintheartedness are out. Brimming confidence has given the party a new dynamic’.267 
Repurposing Grimond’s assembly speech allowed the party to add assertions on their view of 
the party. The mood was being designated as optimistic. It was ambitious too. This campaign 
was stated to lay the foundations ‘to build a Liberal Government’.268 This fed into the second 
theme as the Liberals sought to create the “opportune moment”. They repeatedly asserted that 
the Liberal Party now had everything but the manpower. ‘You have been given a policy’, the 
pamphlet read, and later, ‘the movement is ready’. A ‘bold, radical programme for Britain’ had 
been ‘completed’; ‘the new Party image [was] complete’ too; indeed, the eight-point Party 
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Programme established at the 1961 Assembly was laid out in full on the inside cover.269 This 
line of argument responded to concerns that the potential voter thought the Liberal Party did 
not really stand for anything.270 To the contrary, claimed the booklet. The image and the policy 
were ready, the party was optimistic and primed for progress, and now it needed the third 
theme: action.  
The language of action was everywhere in Take Britain Ahead. The Party Programme it 
detailed was built on a bullet-point list of action verbs, such as ‘Give up the British H-Bomb’, 
‘Get employers and unions together’ and ‘Make the Common Market a springboard’.271 Indeed, 
the title of the booklet was itself an imperative: ‘Take Britain Ahead’ played on the upbeat 
theme of “progress” by associating Liberal fortunes with the nation’s fortunes. They used a 
tricolon to demonstrate what was missing, writing: ‘You have been given a policy. We have 
got the machine moving. Now we need muscle-power’.272 This was punchy to convey both 
optimism and urgency. Action was the only thing missing. This need for action was targeted at 
the individual: ‘You have got to make [Liberal progress] an absolute avalanche’. The onus was 
on ‘you’.273 This was both a call to action and an assertion that the Liberal Party was ready to 
“make the leap” towards government. The only missing piece was an individual’s support. The 
themes all aligned. There was optimism that this was the opportune moment for action. 
Related metaphors were used in the ‘Tell the Nation’ campaign of 1962-1963 to demonstrate 
a similar need for action. The earlier ‘Call to Action’ campaign was deemed to have succeeded 
and, in the light of by-election successes of 1962, the task was seen as needing to continue 
Liberal recruitment.274 Grimond addressed the hand-picked audience of opinion leaders 
directly in the Get Britain Moving booklet’s introductory message, challenging them to use 
their local influence to drive the Liberal Party forward. ‘Will you put your weight behind the 
Liberal advance?’, he asked, making clear their role.275 The Liberal Party had the framework 
of the party machine but needed local surges to convert that into winning seats, and in his 
concluding call to action, Grimond used another metaphor to make this need clear. He wanted 
Liberal supporters who would ‘get off the touchline and into the game’ and, just a few words 
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later, those who would ‘get their shoulder to the wheel’.276 All these were metaphors of action 
to encourage collective effort. Once again, the party made clear that they had the principles and 
they had the policies. Now Grimond tried to exhort these selected opinion leaders to mobilise 
for the Liberal cause.  
The campaigns also used negative emotional appeals as an attempt to provoke action. In 
particular, they tried to instil frustration in the potential Liberal voter, as seen in the Take 
Britain Ahead booklet. As seen in this thesis to be common in Liberal rhetoric, Jo Grimond 
sought to attack Labour and the Conservatives to provoke an emotional response from the 
potential Liberal voter. Grimond used anaphora to attack the incumbent Conservative 
government for its economic record, stating that ‘it not only looks a bad Government and feels 
a bad Government, it is a very bad Government’.277 With lines like this, Grimond was trying 
to convert transitory public dissatisfaction with the government into belief that there was a 
deep-seated problem. He used humour to continue this point. He used a metaphor to ground 
this contention in the supposed economic issues, contending that the government ‘could not 
even run a sweety shop in the Lothian Road’.278 This was aggressive rhetoric designed to trigger 
a reaction. He went on to criticise particular Conservative figures, prefaced with the joke that 
his party had ‘certain negative advantages’. Grimond stated that ‘The Liberal Party has not got 
Sir David Eccles. We have not got Mr Butler to pretend he is a Liberal and yet to stop all 
sensible Liberal reforms. We have not got Mr Duncan Sandys to ruin our defences. We have 
not got the Prime Minister, who says Berlin is all the fault of the newspapers.’279 He tried to 
locate disillusion in specific cases through use of ridicule.   
Similar attacks on Labour followed. Grimond urgently asserted that these problems with the 
Conservative government exacerbated the need for a strong opposition, now. For him, this 
could not be provided due to a dysfunctional ideology. This was therefore aimed at a particular 
stated audience: the Labour voter disillusioned with Socialist ideology. Its ‘wasted idealism’ 
was ‘out-of-date’ and ‘harmful’.280 It left the party too reliant on trade union support and thus 
too prone to pander to their interests. Grimond attempted to stoke Labour dissatisfaction 
through his assertion of its ideological problems. He used ridiculing humour here too, saying 
that Labour ‘kept up appearance of unity only by having no policy on most of the major issues 
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of the day’.281 In ideology and in policy the party was not fit for purpose. The negative rhetoric 
aimed at both parties sought to both create and capture any major party disillusion. Grimond 
did this through damaging assertions on the state of the two main parties. He assumed this role 
of political commentator to credibly explain the should-be causes of disillusion.  
The Autumn Campaign of 1965 called for real change. The leaflet appealed for change so soon 
after the 1964 election by portraying that election as one where the public voted for change 
after thirteen years of Conservative government, and portraying the situation since as one 
where the elected Labour Party had failed to offer it. The Liberals had doubled their vote, 
creating an opportunity, the party claimed. The Liberal for a real change leaflet, an appeal to 
the public, was exhortative.282 The introductory theme was change. The Liberals asserted that 
people voted for change in electing Labour in 1964. They contended that the change had not 
worked, arguing that ‘Mr Wilson’s government [had] turned out just as conservative as the 
Tories’.283 They thus asserted that the desire for change existed but had not been satisfied. The 
Liberals were the next alternative to turn to. That was the only way to achieve the ‘real change’ 
to ‘get Britain moving’. The thematic detail that followed (see next paragraph) reflected this 
argument more tangibly. The conclusion was a summary plea of past, present and future. 
‘You’ll get no change from the Tories, you’re getting short change from Labour, you’ll get real 
change from the Liberals’, it read.284 This tricolon was the crux of the leaflet’s appeal. The 
party were trying to latch onto the favourable mood of change whilst ruling the two main parties 
out of being able to offer it. It re-narrated the last year of British history into a story of 
unsatiated desire for change. 
The party attacked the Conservative and Labour parties as well as more positively encouraging 
Liberal sympathisers to become Liberal members. Indeed, that was the structure of each themed 
paragraph in the leaflet. The Liberals first addressed the cost of living. They attacked the main 
parties for price rises, such as petrol going up by six-pence in Labour’s current term.285 This 
was used as proof of the need for change. The context of a current Labour Government after 
over a decade of Conservative rule meant that the Liberals did not really distinguish between 
the parties as government and opposition. They conflated negative appeals against the two. In 
the classic format, they then provided the Liberal solution to the problem. They would lower 
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the cost of living by ‘outlawing monopolies’ and ‘removing tariffs’.286 The party then explained 
the fundamentals of why it was the party to carry out such change. The situation needed an 
independent party that was free to represent the interests of the consumer rather than the vested 
interests of trade union or big business. This trope of problem-solution-justification was 
common and used again in the paragraph on house-building, where the Liberals pledged to 
build 500,000 homes a year through the creation of regional development agencies.287 The 
Liberals combined negative and positive appeals to prove the continued need for change.  
The party also tried to attract the non-Liberal through positive appeals on its offering. The 
National Executive Committee of the Liberal Party had concluded at the beginning of 1963 
that the party’s image was gradually transitioning from moderate and vague to exciting and 
modern.288 It wanted to continue this transformation in the ‘Tell the Nation’ campaign. The 
title alone – ‘Get Britain Moving’ – implied a desire for progress.289 The booklet focused on 
the policy of education as a microcosm of the broader need for forward, technological change. 
It was both problem and solution. Education standards were said to have ‘lagged disastrously’ 
in comparison to other European industrialised nations because the Conservative and Labour 
parties simply did not know how to make positive change. The authors placed education reform 
on the agenda by asserting it to be their ‘most urgent single job’290 and called for new schools, 
universities and technical colleges to create a ‘highly trained humane society, ready to meet 
technological change’.291 The use of ‘meet’ showed Liberal desire to remain at the cusp of the 
technological curve rather than either getting swept up in technological change or slipping 
behind other countries. As typical with Liberal rhetoric, it was the attitude that was as important 
as the practical policy. This policy example was aimed to prove themselves as an exciting, 
forward-looking but responsible party. This shows how Liberal rhetoric was creative in 
selecting a single issue to respond to an imperative decided upon in strategy discussions.  
The ‘Liberal Crusade’ between 1967 and 1970 took the typical Liberal structure of negative 
and positive appeals. The party themed the campaign around ‘people’ and how the state of 
Britain and British politics was impacting the individual. As Robinson et al argued, a ‘popular, 
aspirational form of individualism’ was developing, a trend onto which the Liberals attempted 
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to latch.292 The campaign appealed to pathos by asserting a mood of disillusion. As seen, the 
first subheading of the 1967 leaflet, The Liberal Crusade: People Count, was ‘to hell with 
politicians’ – a pejorative phrase to capture a mood of anger.293 In 1970 the electorate were 
asserted to be ‘fed up’ and in a state of ‘public apathy’.294 This was predicated on the political 
system’s treatment of the individual. In the 1970 leaflet, Join the Liberal Crusade, the Liberals 
argued that the public were being subjugated as ‘pawns’ rather than people.295 This claim was 
based on a lack of agency for the individual. Wealth was concentrated into ‘the hands of the 
minority’; power was concentrated into ‘the few at the centre’. The final passionate cry was 
‘We are not pawns. Why should they always decide for us?’. This was complemented by the 
positive appeal, identical in both leaflets: that ‘before anything else Liberalism is about 
people’.296 These principles drove policy decisions. It was characterised by the policy of 
devolution. A share in production needed to trickle down to the individual worker and a share 
in government needed to trickle down to the locale.297 This is another example of the Liberals 
demonstrating themselves to be the fundamental solution to a problem. The main parties did 
not care about the individual and the Liberals had the attitudes and the subsequent policies to 
remedy this. Studying this content reminds us that though these campaigns were distinct 
creations, the Liberals naturally made them reflective of their broader rhetoric. These leaflets 
were aimed at mixed audiences inside and outside the party but the rhetoric was similar across 
the campaign; this shows that it is still a creative rhetorical choice to appeal differently to 
internal or external audiences.  
When aimed at non-Liberals these campaigns were essentially a series of recruitment drives. 
The immediate goal was to win an individual as a member rather than as a voter. In some ways 
this fact did not change the nature of the appeal. Typical Liberal rhetorical structures such as 
“positive-negative” and “problem-solution-justification” were deployed repeatedly, or often a 
specific issue was spotlighted. However, the campaigns sought to create feeling within the 
external audiences that would drive them to the immediate action – subscribing as a member. 
They sought to inspire frustration based on a need for change, and optimism that the ambitious 
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Liberal Party could offer that change, in hope that these feelings might lead to the desired 
action. 
Mobilising Members into Workers 
At the same time, these campaigns appealed to audiences already within the Liberal Party. The 
party sought to craft campaigns and mobilise existing members into activity such as leaflet 
distribution or arranging meetings. The ‘Call to Action’ campaign of 1961 and the ‘Autumn 
Campaign’ of 1965 were both, indeed, calls to action, with contrasting degrees of emotionality. 
The section then considers the ‘Liberal Crusade’ of 1967 to 1970, with its longer-term 
campaign ultimately aimed at election readiness. Here the Liberals served their organisational 
and financial imperatives through rhetoric that created an appeal of credibility and 
completeness. 
The Call to Action leaflet was aimed at constituency associations and intended to support and 
inspire the actual running of the campaign locally.298 It was practical and organisational to 
provide instructions to carry out the campaign, and it used a rhetoric of action throughout to 
mobilise local members. In laying out practical details of the campaign, it provided its value in 
making it as easy as possible for local associations to understand and enact. The Liberals 
provided information for all stages of the campaign. Beforehand the associations were told to 
recruit stewards and speakers; during the campaign they were instructed to distribute contact 
cards and make return calls; after the campaign they needed to encourage new members to 
become active in the party.299 The level of detail is revealing about how a campaign actually 
runs in practice. It was driven by engagement. Anyone could become a ‘Campaign Steward’ 
to perform simple tasks such as posting leaflets or bringing friends along to meetings.300 The 
local press were to be sent a bulletin with information such as a programme of meetings. The 
leaflet set out a weekly timetable for planning the campaign from July to September and 
running it from September to November. The associations were given everything they needed 
to carry out the campaign. This form of content might be labelled as “non-rhetorical” but 
rhetoric can be enabling of action as well as encouraging of it. Guiding the local associations 
simply and easily through the running of the campaign was a more indirect form of persuading 
action. 
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The Liberals’ ultimate goal of the Call to Action leaflet was just that – to call their members 
into action.301 It was a kairos – an opportune time for action – due to progress already made by 
the party. This was presented with great optimism. The Liberals stated that it was a ‘time of 
great opportunity’ because ‘there [were] thousands of new Liberals’.302 These people would 
not need to be converted – simply enrolled. Positive feeling towards the Liberals existed and 
the party needed to capitalise upon this. Local support needed to be ‘wholehearted and 
enthusiastic’ to take this chance for a political breakthrough.303 This justified the rhetoric of 
action that followed. 
The rhetoric of action proliferated this publication as much as the accompanying booklet for 
the public. The campaign instructions used action verbs, with local associations told ‘Set up an 
Action Committee’, ‘Notify the local papers’, and ‘Arrange a programme of meetings’.304 It 
was indeed to be a very active campaign, based on delivering reading material and contacting 
potential members. This idea was bolstered by the party presenting action as a characteristic of 
theirs. It described itself as the party that ‘gets things done for all the people’. The language of 
action was used to emphasise that this was a moment for action, despite the next election being 
at least two years away. Grimond appealed to Liberal members in the Take Britain Ahead 
booklet to ‘button-hole your neighbours’, assigning personal responsibility to local activists to 
personally ensure enrolments.305 This appeal for membership rather than votes was outside of 
the rituals of party electioneering. The party therefore had to exhort its existing members to 
mobilise outside of election time, creating a moment with particular opportunities and 
imperatives. 
The Autumn Campaign 1965 leaflet also aimed to turn Liberal members into workers.306 It 
needed to emotionally provoke action as well as practically provide help. It was not dissimilar 
to the earlier Call to Action leaflet in attempting to create a moment, but was occasionally more 
aggressive in its exhortation of action. This shows that imperatives produce certain exigencies 
that must be achieved but it is still a creative rhetorical act in how to achieve them. The party 
presented ‘the Liberal opportunity’.307 People were disillusioned with both the Conservatives 
and Labour parties because of the need for (a usually unspecified) change. Those who voted 
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Labour in 1964 expecting a change were now ‘sadder and wiser’. The Liberals asserted this as 
the opportune moment, saying ‘this is why we must make our policies known NOW’.308 The 
necessary alternative was Liberal change and this could only be achieved if Liberal members 
went out to ‘bang on the knocker’ and stimulate support. There was therefore, again, language 
of action to mobilise members. They used the imperative verb form to convey urgency and 
importance, such as ‘hold a special welcoming meeting’.309 This was a set of orders rather than 
a list of suggestions as the party passionately pleaded for action.  
More emotive language was used as the party laid out the practicalities of the campaign too. 
The campaign was repeatedly described as an ‘attack’.310 It discussed getting new members 
involved in the party, and said that all new members should be encouraged to be involved, even 
if the local associations were not convinced of an individual’s use. This was because ‘new 
blood which proves useless [could] easily be shed’.311 The party was portraying itself as 
ruthless in the pursuit of progress. These were practicalities of the campaign’s organisation but 
they were no matter-of-fact list. Language of blood and conflict gave more seriousness to the 
campaign. The party needed to prove that this campaign mattered, because the last election was 
only a year ago. The organisational imperatives and internal audience were similar to the Call 
to Action campaign four years earlier, but the tone of rhetoric was markedly more aggressive 
to create this moment for action. Such language made the organisational practicalities seem far 
more than a series of mundane jobs to tick off. This shows the creative agency of the Liberal 
Party to manipulate its rhetoric in certain ways to satisfy imperatives and appeal to audiences.  
For their campaign of 1967 the Liberals chose a long-term ‘crusade’ to transform the party 
from a third party to a main contender for power.312 It differed from previous as it covered the 
whole parliament until the coming of the next general election in 1970 or 1971. This case study 
examines the format of the campaign and, particularly, its financial imperatives. It launched a 
one million pound appeal in 1970 to pursue its electoral ambitions.313 
This Liberal ‘crusade’ took a more all-encompassing format than the earlier campaigns. The 
key introductory and concluding leaflets sought to appeal within and outside the party to satisfy 
electoral, organisational and financial imperatives. It appealed to internal audiences, that ‘every 
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Liberal [might] pledge himself to wholehearted achievement’, and external audiences, that 
‘every non-Liberal [might] see from this plan that the Liberal Party really means business’.314 
It focused less on specific details of running the campaign and more on vaster plans for political 
progress. The 1967 leaflet The Liberal Crusade made positive and negative appeals before 
segueing into an organisational plan for each year from 1967 and 1970.315 This was both a call 
to action for the local associations and a proof for the non-Liberal that this crusade was rooted 
in thought-out plans. In 1967 the focus was the broad structure of the ‘party machine’. By 1970, 
600 constituencies across the country were to be on an election footing. These complete plans 
were a way of appealing in themselves. They emanated confidence and proved ambition. The 
organisational imperatives served a dual purpose. They were calls to action for Liberals and 
non-Liberals, and were deployed as rhetorical tools to prove a full plan for power.  
The party used two terms to reflect this full plan to seek power: ‘crusade’ and ‘plan’. The term 
‘crusade’ implied a Liberal onslaught for progress. The connotations of ‘crusade’ have been 
considered elsewhere in this thesis. It implied passion and principle and tied in with the stated 
importance given to Liberal attitudes. The leaflet in 1967 was subtitled ‘The Liberal Plan for 
Power’.316 This addressed the constant concern that the Liberals were not a credible alternative 
for government. As seen, the fullness of the plan was an appeal in itself to demonstrate that 
credibility. The leaflet pledged to address Liberal ambitions – it saw itself as on ‘the road to 
power’.317 This metaphor implied a journey of progress that the Liberals portrayed themselves 
as taking. It laid out Liberal principles – based on the spread of wealth and power down to the 
individual – and their ‘Plan for Power’ to provide the electorate with the complete picture.318 
That introductory leaflet then moved very logically through annual plans. The language was 
deliberately assured. They introduced each year’s plan with ‘This must be the year in which…’, 
‘This will be the first full year of…’, ‘We shall have improved our…’ and ‘This is the year of 
maximum activity…’ respectively.319 It sought to imbue confidence in both Liberal and non-
Liberal.  
Aligned to the language of ‘plan’ was the rhetoric of target-setting. At a time when the 
imperative was not directly vote winning, there was importance in knowing exactly what one’s 
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support would provide. The ultimate target was, naturally, election readiness. Achieving this 
was based on improving organisational strength both locally and nationally. Part of the appeal 
was simply to have targets to latch onto. In 1967 the party stated ‘Our thinking is clear. Our 
targets are set’ and ‘If it seems ambitious it is because we are ambitious’.320 Then the imperative 
was to enrol Liberals and non-Liberals to help achieve the targets. In 1970 it did this by 
connecting the us (the Liberal Party) with the you (the potential (active) Liberal member). The 
leaflet’s peroration read ‘These are our targets. This our crusade. If you want your voice to be 
heard then you must join our crusade. Without your help we cannot win. And for Britain’s sake 
we must win’.321 It conveyed urgency through the short sentence structure to call for this extra 
action outside of election time. It aligned Liberal prospects with national prospects to continue 
the plea for credibility in showing that the Liberals could influence the national interest. And 
it related it to wider Liberal arguments about the role of the individual by imploring the reader 
to ‘want [their] voice to be heard’.322 In this way the Liberals grounded the appeal in the 
personal. They set urgent targets that required and benefited the individual.  
A key target was financial. They called for £1 million in 1967 at the start of campaign and then 
again in 1970. To pursue this particular imperative the Liberals deployed an ethos of 
seriousness in their introduction to the 1970 leaflet Join the Liberal Crusade.323 They had to 
justify the financial appeal. They wanted the money ‘because the Liberal Party mean[t] 
business. [They were] not content to remain a minority pressure group of good intentions’ 
(implying that they previously were!). They portrayed themselves negatively so as to make 
their new appeal starker and demonstrate that something had changed for the better in Liberal 
ambitions. Again they were attempting to assert credibility. They explicitly connected Liberal 
fortunes to national fortunes as this money would help ‘rid Britain of its disillusionment’.324 In 
1967 they provided pages of detail to justify the appeal, such as to revive derelict constituencies 
or target particularly winnable constituencies. Action-oriented language was seen again in the 
call ‘Help us to make it a million’;325 again the Liberals were placing the onus on the individual 
to act. They always linked it back to electoral ambitions as that was the avenue to bring about 
political change. The target had been slightly scaled down by 1970. The ultimate reason for the 
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financial appeal was now to ‘back over 500 Liberal candidates at the next General Election’.326 
The whole campaign was predicated on election readiness. This theme both implied credibility 
as a genuine electoral option and encouraged involvement behind a weighty goal. 
Across the 1960s, then, the Liberal Party faced certain organisational imperatives as its main 
mid-cycle focus. It needed its existing members to be active in running the campaigns both to 
attract more members and to improve constituency organisation for election readiness. For this 
it particularly used the rhetoric of action to encourage its members to mobilise outside of 
elections. The organisational imperatives also became an appeal in their own right. In the 
Liberal Crusade at the end of the 1960s the party based its appeal around a complete plan for 
power with an all-encompassing programme to become ready for government.  
*** 
This chapter has shown that the ultimate goal of each Liberal Party campaign throughout the 
period was always some sort of big political surge. This applied both within the party, in 
increasing organisational readiness for a future election, and outside the party, in enlisting new 
members. By the end of the decade, financial imperatives drove Liberal rhetoric too. These 
campaigns have revealed the particular exigencies of the Liberal Party as a minor party in 
British politics between 1959 and 1974. The Liberals lacked a core support base or a steady 
income stream and so needed to generate as much local constituency activity as possible. They 
had to think about membership and money when it was not the time to think about votes. These 
imperatives were unavoidable and part of what Bitzer considered within the rhetorical 
situation.327  
The campaigns were therefore intended to create a moment whereby it was possible to work 
towards these goals. Rhetoric is audience-facing and so the rhetorical situation is also 
something that needs to be created for your audiences. The Liberals sought to create scenarios 
where, whether through frustration or through optimism, the audience was inspired to take 
action in favour of the Liberal cause. The luxury of the campaigns as a rhetorical context was 
that each leaflet could be targeted to a specific audience of the Liberals’ choosing. 
The campaign context allowed different appeals to be targeted towards external and internal 
audiences and therefore affirms Dommett’s distinction between public and party rhetoric.328 
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On one level the Liberals simply created contrasting rhetoric to respond to different imperatives 
and contexts. Predominantly, non-Liberals were appealed to through a rhetoric of frustration 
and Liberals were appealed to through a rhetoric of urgency. The campaigns do also 
demonstrate how the distinction can be blurred in practice. The contrasting audiences both 
formed part of the same rhetorical moment of opportunity. The Liberals were trying to mobilise 
both towards the same end goal: Liberal Party electoral progress. To both, Liberal ambitions 






















Conclusion: the dual value of inserting rhetorical theory into political analysis 
Over the last decade there has been a revival in political historians’ appreciation of rhetoric. Its 
techniques and appeals have been studied both in their own right and as a tool to learn more 
about political parties or individuals. This work has perhaps understandably focused on the 
Labour and Conservative parties, but this thesis suggests that paying more attention to minor 
party rhetoric reveals much about both the party’s history and the rhetorical process more 
broadly. In this conclusion, I consider what this study of Liberal rhetoric tells us about the party 
itself between 1959 and 1974, before suggesting what it contributes to rhetorical analysis more 
generally.  
A rhetorical perspective on Liberal Party history, 1959-1974 
Studying Liberal Party rhetoric emphasises three specific challenges facing the Liberal Party 
in the period 1959 to 1974. Narrative histories of the Liberal Party have reflected on the 
problems it faced but the rhetorical approach allows us to move into the detail of how these 
challenges were conceived in strategy discussions and dealt with in creative expression.329  
Firstly, strategy discussions reveal that the Liberal Party understood its image to be vague, 
particularly at the beginning of the 1960s. The electorate was deemed not to know what the 
party stood for. This vagueness was a phenomenon of the centre of politics that might be 
considered rhetorically for different parties, countries and periods. At best, the party was 
received as “moderate”; at worst, it conveyed no image of any clarity at all. The party and its 
candidates met the challenge of clarifying a distinct image through two overarching rhetorical 
acts. First, candidates predominantly appealed to ethos by centring the importance of their 
personal characteristics, creating an image of the Liberals as a caring party which had the 
interests of the individual as its priority. This focus on the personal was an attempt to counteract 
their third-party status, appreciating that they would win most votes for an individual rather 
than for the party. Second, the national party established an identity through framing, building 
an image based on its way of seeing both themselves and British politics generally. In the 1960s 
this was predicated on the importance of the values underpinning policies and in the 1970s 
these values became the basis for a distinctive Liberal version of a wider ‘politics-in-crisis’ 
frame. This study has used the lens of rhetoric to move beyond historiographical assertions of 
a vague, centre party image into these specifics of how the party sought to clarify its image.330  
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Secondly, the party’s target audience was understood to be diffuse. As typical of a smaller 
party, the Liberals had a small core vote and were unsure who their potential voters actually 
were.331 In their rhetoric they therefore tried to simultaneously both construct the “liberal 
voter” and appeal to what it imagined to be its potential audience. First, claiming to have a 
potentially large audience generated electoral credibility for the party in enabling appeals of 
optimism that electoral progress could be possible. This reflected an implicit pressure on minor 
parties to prove that they did have an eventual chance of electoral success to bridge a credibility 
gap with the major parties in a time of Conservative and Labour party dominance. Second, the 
party associated its intended audience with attributes such as care for the individual. It tied this 
in with its personal image to ascribe characteristics of care and compassion as particularly 
Liberal attributes. This worked with the desire for a broadly-based appeal. This reflected the 
minor party problem of not being sure who its potential voter was so it attempted to create a 
vast catchment area to ensure that any potential voter sharing these “liberal values” was not 
excluded. Even if in reality the party knew that its vote was regional or stronger amongst certain 
demographic groups, its rhetoric sought to make its potential reach seem truly national, even if 
it was simultaneously rooted in individuals and local issues. 
Thirdly, a rhetorical perspective has reemphasised the Liberal Party’s constant concern with 
membership and finance. Lacking a support base and any large income streams, the party could 
not simply arrive at an election with a stable core vote and party machine to be rolled out. For 
the Liberals, electoral success was as much dictated by the intervening years as by election-
time, and the party’s rhetoric reflected this. The party’s out-of-election-time campaigns really 
mattered; studying them for the first time has shown these imperatives working in practice, 
revealing how they were conceived strategically and responded to rhetorically. Such campaigns 
embodied the rhetorical activity necessary in pursuit of these imperatives. The party used 
language of optimism and action, seeking to create moments for Liberal support even when the 
immediate task was not to win votes. It encouraged non-Liberals to become members through 
the language of frustration and it encouraged members to mobilise in building up local support 
through Liberal optimism. To both internal and external audiences, it constantly argued that 
now was the opportune time for action to bring about Liberal political progress. This was a 
type of rhetoric developed by the Liberals which responded to the centre and third-party 
problems detailed above. 
 




Implications for the study of rhetoric 
Studying a political party’s activities in depth has foregrounded the importance of a rhetorical 
mode of analysis. More than just a speech or election-time device, rhetoric should be studied 
as a process. Focusing on all areas from strategy minutes to creative expression has shown that 
the rhetorical process incorporates everything from invention to delivery. Liberal mid-cycle 
campaigns throughout the 1960s particularly exemplify this. The party located the problem of 
needing membership and financial boosts to make political progress, with the ultimate goal 
being to improve election readiness. It decided to tackle this imperative with out-of-election-
time campaigns. It selected the contrasting audiences of members and non-members and chose 
a leaflet format for the crux of the campaign. Finally, it expressed varied rhetoric based on 
frustration, optimism and action. Each of these acts were rhetorical and ought to be assessed as 
part of a connected rhetorical process.  
Studying political party rhetoric has therefore allowed us to understand a lot more about party 
politics. It provides insight into the variety of challenges that parties face and every step in 
dealing with them. Party politics is a lot more than just trying to win votes at election time, so 
rhetoric was a constant tool for the Liberal Party to pursue its goals, rather than just to be 
deployed in a parliamentary election campaign. Both party politics and rhetoric are predicated 
on an end goal of persuasion. The party used different types of rhetoric to persuade different 
audiences. For example, it used rhetoric based on action to encourage its members to carry out 
campaigns outside of election time, and it used rhetoric based on party image to define its 
appeals to the electorate. Studying rhetoric reveals a lot about how contrasting imperatives 
were pursued. Challenges are met rhetorically and so can only be fully understood when 
considered as part of the rhetorical process.   
Applying rhetorical analysis to the Liberal Party has revealed three areas that need more 
consideration in rhetorical studies than has traditionally been the case. The first is Kenneth 
Burke’s theory of identification.332 Central to Liberal Party appeals to ethos, identification was 
the process used to link their party image to their potential audience. In 1970, for example, the 
Liberals assigned themselves the quality of being caring and then identified that same quality 
in the potential Liberal voter. This helps us understand the process of ethos appeals appearing 
in practice. Identification was the outcome of Liberal rhetoric expressing shared positive 
characteristics with its audience to create a basis from which to appeal further. Studying 
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identification shows too how appeals to ethos rely on appeals to logos and pathos. To identify 
with your audience, you need to connect with their emotional state (an appeal to pathos) and 
convince them that the sharing of some value or opinion is a first step towards voting (an appeal 
to logos). Building on the work of Judi Atkins, then, this should encourage further thought both 
about identification specifically and more generally about how appeals to ethos (and logos and 
pathos) are actually created. 
The second concept is the rhetorical frame. Studying this has provided great insight into what 
the Liberal Party both considered and professed to be important. Framing has been considered 
in political science (particularly in America) but has not yet become as central to rhetorical 
political analysis as it should be.333 In 1960s, Liberals used their rhetoric to frame politics 
around the importance of party values, of partnership and care for the individual – the principles 
underpinning their policies. Locating this rhetorical frame tells us both that the Liberal Party 
considered values important as a philosophical guide for its principles and activities, and as a 
way of presenting its party’s offering to the electorate. In the 1970s, the Liberals constructed 
their version of a crisis in British politics based on major party failure to improve the economic 
and industrial situations. Identifying this frame reveals that the Liberals both perceived that 
this crisis was an important issue and appealed to the electorate by presenting it in a certain 
way. Asking what worldviews underpin the invention of particular rhetoric is a crucial question 
to understand both what a political party considers to be important and how it subsequently 
presents that important issue to the electorate.  
A third area that has proven revealing for this thesis is the Liberal Party out-of-election-time 
campaign. As said, these campaigns, as attempts to create opportunities outside of voting, 
exemplified the fact that rhetoric is a continuous creative process towards achieving chosen 
imperatives. Studying campaigns reminds us that political rhetoric is not directly centred 
around election time, or vote winning, but around the pursuit of varied imperatives. The 
campaigns demonstrated the membership and financial imperatives of the party in ways which 
election-time rhetoric do not. This thesis has located in the campaigns a broader conception of 
rhetoric by showing us a different type of rhetoric. Rhetoric is not just forced to work within 
existing moments of political activity but is a tool to be used creatively in creating a moment 
for political activity. To achieve this in the campaigns the Liberals both had to assert a 
particular mood and also persuade that now was the specific, necessary time for action.  
 




This thesis has studied Liberal Party history between 1959 and 1974 by combining an empirical 
study with rhetorical theory. This conceptual history has revealed much about the Liberal Party 
that more typical narrative histories pass over, and the in-depth party analysis has contributed 
to our understanding of longer-term rhetorical acts such as crafting a party image or running a 
campaign. I have distinguished between the party’s political history and rhetorical analysis for 
this conclusion, but the most productive research comes in combining the two. This thesis has 
used analysis of rhetoric to learn more about the Liberal Party’s activity, but the process of 
grounding rhetorical theory in historical examples has in turn required us to refine the theory. 
To learn more about political parties, we need to continue to develop better analytical tools to 
understand the role of rhetoric in political activity. This reflexive approach has shown the 
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